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PRODUCT  HOPPING:  A  NEW  FRAMEWORK
Michael A. Carrier* & Steve D. Shadowen**
ABSTRACT
One of the most misunderstood and anticompetitive business behaviors in today’s economy
is “product hopping,” which occurs when a brand-name pharmaceutical company switches from
one version of a drug to another.  These switches, benign in appearance but not necessarily in
effect, can significantly decrease consumer welfare, impairing competition from generic drugs to
an extent that greatly exceeds any gains from the “improved” branded product.
The antitrust analysis of product hopping is nuanced.  It implicates the intersection of
antitrust law, patent law, the Hatch-Waxman Act, and state drug product selection laws.  In
fact, the behavior is even more complex because it occurs in uniquely complicated markets charac-
terized by doctors who choose the product but don’t pay for it, and consumers who buy the product
but don’t choose it.
It is thus unsurprising that courts have offered inconsistent approaches to product hopping.
They have paid varying levels of attention to the regulatory structure, offered a simplistic analysis
of consumer choice, adopted an underinclusive antitrust standard based on coercion, and
focused on whether the brand firm removed the original drug from the market.
Entering this morass, we offer a new framework that courts, government enforcers, plain-
tiffs, and manufacturers can employ to analyze product hopping.  This rigorous and balanced
framework is the first to incorporate the economic characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry.
For starters, it defines a “product hop” to include only those instances in which the brand manu-
facturer (1) reformulates the product in a way that makes the generic non-substitutable and (2)
encourages doctors to write prescriptions for the reformulated product rather than the original.
The test also offers two safe harbors, which are more deferential than current caselaw, to ensure
that the vast majority of reformulations will not be subject to antitrust scrutiny.
The analysis then examines whether a brand’s product hop passes the “no-economic-sense”
test.  In other words, would the reformulation make economic sense for the brand if it did not
have the effect of impairing generic competition?  Merely introducing new products would pass
the test.  Encouraging doctors to write prescriptions for the reformulated rather than the original
product—“cannibalizing” the brand’s own sales—might not.  Imposing antitrust liability on
behavior that does not make business sense other than through its impairment of generic competi-
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tion offers a conservative approach and minimizes “false positives” in which courts erroneously
find liability.  Showing just how far the courts have veered from justified economic analysis, the
test would recommend a different analysis than that used in each of the five product-hopping
cases that have been litigated to date, and a different outcome in two of them.
By carefully considering the regulatory environment, practicalities of prescription drug mar-
kets, manufacturers’ desire for clear-cut rules, and consumers’ needs for a rule that promotes price
competition without deterring valued innovations, the framework promises to improve and stand-
ardize the antitrust analysis of product hopping.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most misunderstood and anticompetitive business behaviors
in today’s economy is “product hopping.”  A brand-name pharmaceutical
company switches from one version of a drug (say, capsule) to another (say,
tablet).  The concern with this conduct is that some of these switches can
significantly decrease consumer welfare, impairing competition from generic
drugs to an extent that greatly exceeds any gains from the “improved”
branded product.
The antitrust analysis of product hopping is nuanced.  It implicates the
intersection of antitrust law, patent law, the Hatch-Waxman Act, and state
drug product selection laws.  In fact, the behavior is even more complex
because it involves uniquely complicated markets characterized by buyers
(insurance companies, patients) who are different from the decisionmakers
(physicians).
It thus should not be a surprise that courts have offered inconsistent
approaches to product hopping.  Some have emphasized the regulatory
structure while others have ignored it.  Some have offered a simplistic analy-
sis of consumer choice, while others have adopted an underinclusive test
based on coercion.  Nearly all have focused on whether the brand firm
removed the original drug from the market (a “hard switch”) or left it on the
market (a “soft switch”).
Entering this morass, we offer a new framework that courts, government
enforcers, plaintiffs, and manufacturers can employ to analyze product hop-
ping.  The framework, which is balanced and rigorous, is the first to incorpo-
rate the characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry.  For starters, it defines
a “product hop” to include only those instances in which the brand
manufacturer:
(1) reformulates the product in a way that makes the generic non-substi-
tutable; and
(2) encourages doctors to write prescriptions for the reformulated
product rather than the original.
This definition excludes many product reformulations, such as those in
which the brand manufacturer does not “cannibalize”1 sales of the original
1 “Cannibalize” is an industry term loosely defined as the brand manufacturer’s mar-
keting against its own original product to encourage doctors to switch their prescriptions
to the reformulated product. See Steve D. Shadowen et al., Anticompetitive Product Changes
in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 44–45 (2009).
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product.  It also avoids targeting brand reformulations designed to improve
the product by competing with other brands or growing the market, reserv-
ing its focus for the switching of the market in order to stifle generic
competition.
Where the brand’s conduct does not satisfy both elements of a product
hop, it is not subject to antitrust scrutiny.  And when the conduct does meet
both elements, our framework offers two stages of analysis.  First, we propose
two safe harbors that are more deferential than current caselaw and that
ensure that the vast majority of reformulations will not face antitrust review.
And second, for reformulations that are product hops and are outside
the safe harbors, the framework examines whether the hop passes the “no-
economic-sense” test.  In other words, would the product hop make eco-
nomic sense for the brand if the hop did not have the effect of impairing
generic competition?  Merely introducing new products would pass the test
(indeed, would not even constitute a product hop).  Encouraging doctors to
write prescriptions for the reformulated rather than the original product—
cannibalizing the brand’s own sales—might not. Imposing antitrust liability
on behavior that does not make business sense—other than through its
impairment of generic competition—offers a conservative approach and
minimizes “false positives” in which courts erroneously find liability.  In fact,
our framework offers manufacturers three opportunities to sidestep antitrust
liability: (1) avoid our definition of “product hop”; (2) be covered by one of
the safe harbors; or (3) undertake conduct that makes economic sense.
Showing just how far the courts have veered from justified economic analysis,
the test would recommend a different analysis than that used in each of the
five product-hopping cases that have been litigated to date, and a different
outcome in two of them.
By carefully considering the regulatory environment, realities of pre-
scription drug markets, manufacturers’ desire for clear-cut rules, and con-
sumers’ needs for a rule that promotes price competition without deterring
valued innovations, the framework promises to improve the antitrust analysis
of product hopping.
Part I offers a background on product hopping.  Section A categorizes
various types of reformulations.  Sections B and C address the relevant regu-
lations: the Hatch-Waxman Act and state substitution laws.  Section D then
focuses on the crucial element of timing, explaining how generic entry
before a brand reformulates a drug dramatically reduces price.
Part II highlights the market failure that is unique to the pharmaceutical
industry.  Section A describes the “price disconnect” that distinguishes pre-
scription drugs from other products and that separates the consumer’s
price/quality determination that is unified in other markets.  Section B ana-
lyzes drug patents, emphasizing the limited role of the patent system and, in
particular, the lack of a requirement of a medical improvement over earlier
versions.  Part C then provides several indicia of market failure based on
medical evidence, the price of patented drugs in Mexico, U.S. prices before
prescriptions were required, and lower prices in countries that have solved
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the price disconnect.  Given the absence of these measures in the United
States, Part D highlights the importance of antitrust law.
Part III examines the five judicial analyses of product hopping.  Section
A begins with TriCor, in which the court offered a nuanced analysis, albeit
one that some later courts limited to “hard switches,” i.e., those in which the
brand withdraws the original product from the market.  Section B covers the
Walgreens case, which offered a simplistic analysis of consumer choice in the
context of a “soft switch” in which the brand did not withdraw the original
product from the market.  The first two product-hopping decisions, TriCor
and Walgreens, framed the analysis for later decisions, with some courts
assuming that hard switches could violate the antitrust laws but soft switches
could not.
The Suboxone case addressed in Section C revealed aspects of both hard
and soft switches, with the court offering a nuanced understanding of the
regulatory regime.  The Doryx case covered in Section D, in contrast, is an
outlier that neglected the regime altogether.  Section E then focuses on
Namenda, which considered the regulatory regime in the context of hard
switches, offering an underinclusive framework based on coercion.  While
the courts generally have considered the regulatory regime, Section F dis-
cusses the recent work of scholars that have paid less attention to this impor-
tant issue.
Part IV then presents a new framework for courts to analyze the antitrust
implications of product hopping.  Section A begins with two safe harbors that
brand firms can use if they implement the product hop (1) outside a
“Generic Window” in which generic entry is expected or (2) after a generic
version of the original drug has entered the market.  If the product hop
occurs during one of these windows, it will be immune from antitrust liability.
For product hops subject to antitrust scrutiny, Section B introduces a test
based on whether the hop would make business sense for the brand manu-
facturer if it did not have the effect of impairing generic competition.  Courts
and commentators have advocated a no-economic-sense test in other areas,
but the test remarkably has not been employed in a setting tailor-made for it.
If a brand acquires or maintains monopoly power by engaging in product
hopping that fails the no-economic-sense test, courts should find it liable for
illegal monopolization since the behavior makes no sense other than by sti-
fling generic competition.
Through the application of the no-economic-sense test, we show the
errors of courts that have treated as outcome-determinative the distinction
between hard and soft switches.  In particular, a brand might be anticompeti-
tively undertaking actions that make no economic sense not only when it
makes a hard switch and withdraws the original product from the market, but
also when it makes a soft switch, leaving the original drug on the market but
reformulating the product and “cannibalizing” it (switching sales to the new
version), for example by denigrating, misrepresenting features of, increasing
the price of, or pulling the marketing and promotion from, its original
product.
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Part V then applies the new framework to the five product-hopping cases
presented in Part III.  It supports the conclusions of potential liability in
TriCor, Suboxone, and Namenda, albeit on the different ground of the no-eco-
nomic-sense test.  And it suggests a different outcome from that in the Wal-
greens and Doryx cases on the ground, again, that the product hop lacked
economic sense except for its impairment of generic competition.  The fact
that judicial analysis would be so different under the defendant-friendly no-
economic-sense test shows just how far the courts have veered from justified
economic analysis.
I. PRODUCT HOPPING
Product hopping, which is also known as “evergreening” or “line exten-
sion,” refers to “a drug company’s reformulation of its product”2 and encour-
agement of doctors to prescribe the reformulated, rather than original,
product.  Under our definition, a brand manufacturer engages in a “product
hop” by combining two actions:
(1) reformulating the product in a way that makes a generic version of
the original product not substitutable; and
(2) encouraging doctors to write prescriptions for the reformulated
rather than the original product, i.e., switching the prescription base from
the original to the reformulated product.
This definition of product hopping does not include any instance in
which the manufacturer promotes the original and reformulated products
equally and without encouraging doctors to switch to the reformulated prod-
uct.  For example, brands often, without reducing their promotion of the
original version, introduce modestly adjusted versions of their products to fill
out a product line or satisfy demand for a particular formulation or delivery
mechanism.  In contrast, our definition of a product hop is limited to the
brand’s switch of the prescription base to a reformulated product for which
the generic is not substitutable.  Limiting potential antitrust liability to
instances in which the brand switches the prescription base is crucial: our test
does not target rational brand efforts to expand the prescription base by com-
peting with other branded products or growing the market.  The test instead
identifies and targets a brand’s efforts to migrate the base in order to impair
generic competition.3
2 Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing
Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (2010).
3 The generic-impairing product switches are particularly concerning given the “price
disconnect” between buyers and decisionmakers discussed below. See infra Section II.A
and text preceding Section IV.A.  From a policy and regulatory perspective, the act of
switching the prescription base raises anticompetitive concerns in threatening the generic-
promoting goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act and state drug product substitution laws, see
infra Sections I.B, I.C, through a switch to a reformulation for which a generic cannot be
substituted.  And that conduct lacks any innovation-based justifications because the brand
does not build up the prescription base by competing with other brands or expanding the
market, but merely leverages already-gained power solely by blocking generic entry.
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There are several types of reformulations, which Section A catalogs.  Sec-
tions B and C introduce the foundations of the regulatory regime: the Hatch-
Waxman Act and state substitution laws.  Section D then focuses on a crucial
element of pharmaceutical competition: the timing of the brand’s reformula-
tion in relation to generic entry.
A. Forms of Product Hopping
Product hopping occurs through one (or more than one) of several
types of reformulations.  One category involves new forms, which consist of
switches from a capsule, tablet, injectable, solution, suspension, or syrup to
another form, such as any of the above, as well as extended-release capsules
or tablets, orally dissolving tablets, and chewable tablets.4  For example, the
makers of antidepressant Prozac and cholesterol treatment TriCor switched
from capsule to tablet form, while anxiety-treating Buspar was switched from
tablet to capsule.5
A second type of reformulation involves changing molecule parts
(known as “moieties”) by adding or removing compounds.  More technically,
a manufacturer can switch from a mix of two enantiomers (one of a pair of
chemical compounds that has a mirror image6) to a single enantiomer.  For
example, and foreshadowing the change discussed below from heartburn-
treating Prilosec to Nexium, a manufacturer can “switch from a chemical
compound that is an equal mixture of each enantiomer, only one of which
contains the active ingredient, to a compound that includes only the enanti-
omer that contains the active ingredient.”7  Chemical changes also explain
the switches from allergy medication Claritin to Clarinex, antidepressant
Celexa to Lexapro, and heartburn medication Prevacid to Kapidex.8
A third category of reformulation involves a combination of two or more
drug compositions that had previously been marketed separately.9  Combina-
tions have involved migraine-treatment Treximet (combining Imitrex and
Naproxen Sodium) and high-blood-pressure medications Azor (Norvasc and
Benicar), Caduet (Norvasc and Lipitor), and Exforge (Norvasc and
Diovan).10
4 Shadowen et al., supra note 1, at 24.
5 Id. at 37.
6 Enantiomer, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/enan-
tiomer (last visited Oct. 22, 2016).
7 Shadowen et al., supra note 1, at 24; see also id. at 25 (also including changes to
molecules already on the market resulting in “new esters, new salts, or other non-covalent
derivatives”); infra Section III.B.
8 Shadowen et al., supra note 1, at 38.
9 Id. at 25.
10 Id. at 38–41.
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B. Hatch-Waxman Act
A crucial element of the regulatory framework forming the backdrop of
product hopping is the Hatch-Waxman Act, enacted by Congress in 1984 to
increase generic competition and foster innovation in the pharmaceutical
industry.11
The Act promoted generic competition by creating a new process for
obtaining U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval, encouraging
generics to challenge invalid or noninfringed patents by introducing a 180-
day period of marketing exclusivity for the first generic to do so, and resusci-
tating a defense that allowed generics to experiment on a brand drug during
the patent term.12  The drafters of the Act sought to ensure the provision of
“low-cost, generic drugs for millions of Americans”13 and recognized that
generic competition would save consumers, as well as the federal govern-
ment, millions of dollars each year.14
One central goal of the Act was to expedite generic competition.15
Generic drugs are very similar to patented brand drugs, having the same
active ingredients, dosage, administration, performance, and safety.16
Despite this equivalence, however, generic manufacturers were required,
before the Act, to demonstrate safety and effectiveness by engaging in
lengthy and expensive trials.  They could not begin the process during the
patent term since the FDA approval process took several years17 and the
required tests constituted infringement.18  Generics thus waited until the end
of the term to begin these activities. As a result, they were not able to enter
the market until two or three years after the patent’s expiration.  At the time
of the Hatch-Waxman Act, there were roughly 150 drugs for which the patent
term had lapsed but there was no generic on the market.19
In the Act, Congress encouraged competition through several mecha-
nisms.  First, it allowed generics to experiment on the drug during the patent
11 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, 35 U.S.C.).
12 Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive Ille-
gality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 42–43 (2009).
13 130 CONG. REC. 24,410, 24,427 (1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
14 Id. at 24,456 (statement of Rep. Minish).
15 For an overview of the mechanisms employed to carry out the other primary goal,
fostering innovation, see Carrier, supra note 12, at 43–45 (discussing patent term exten-
sions, non-patent market exclusivity, and an automatic 30-month stay of FDA approval of
generics).
16 Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucm100100.htm (last updated
Jan. 7, 2015).
17 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 38 (1998).
18 Id. at 3.
19 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 17 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647,
2650.
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term.20  Along these lines, the legislature exempted from infringement the
manufacturing, use, or sale of a patented invention for uses “reasonably
related to the development and submission of information” under a federal
law regulating drugs’ manufacture, use, or sale.21
Second, the Act provided 180 days of marketing exclusivity to the first
generic to challenge a brand’s patent or claim that it did not infringe the
patent.22  This exclusivity “was reserved for the first generic firm—known as a
‘Paragraph IV filer’—that sought to enter during the patent term.”23  During
the 180-day period, which begins after the drug’s first commercial marketing,
the FDA is not able to approve other generic applications for the same
product.24
Third, and most relevant for our purposes, Congress created a new pro-
cess for generics to obtain FDA approval.  Before the Act, generic firms that
offered identical products to approved drugs were required to prove safety
and efficacy.25  In fact, one reason that generics decided not to bring drugs
to the market after the expiration of a patent was the time and expense
involved in replicating clinical studies.26  The Act created a new type of drug
application, called an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), through
which generics could rely on brands’ safety and effectiveness studies, thereby
avoiding the need to engage in lengthy and expensive preclinical or clinical
studies.27
In short, faced with the problem of insufficient generic entry and high
drug prices, Congress enacted legislation that introduced several industry-
shaping mechanisms to encourage generic entry.
20 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012).
21 Id. For an elaboration on this discussion, see Carrier, supra note 2, at 1013, from
which this passage draws.
22 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012).  Three other patent certifications apply if the
drug is not patented, the patent has expired, or the generic agrees it will not seek approval
until the patent expires.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
23 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
24 Carrier, supra note 2, at 1014; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY
PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 7 (2002) [hereinafter FTC, GENERIC DRUG
STUDY], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-
prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf.  Until amended in 2003, the
Hatch-Waxman Act included as a second trigger for the 180-day period a court decision
finding invalidity or lack of infringement.  Colleen Kelly, Note, The Balance Between Innova-
tion and Competition: The Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 417, 439–40 (2011).
25 Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: History,
Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 588 (2003).
26 See id.
27 FTC, GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 24, at 5. For an elaboration on this discus-
sion, see Carrier, supra note 2, at 1013, from which this passage draws.
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C. State Drug Product Selection Laws
States have also made it easier for generics to reach the market through
their enactment of drug product selection (DPS) laws.  Such laws, in effect in
all fifty states today, are designed to lower consumer prices.28  The laws allow
(and in some cases require) pharmacists—absent a doctor’s contrary instruc-
tions—to fill prescriptions for brand-name drugs with generic versions.29
States enacted DPS laws to address the price disconnect in the industry,
described in detail below,30 between doctors, who prescribe a drug but are
not directly responsive to drug pricing, and insurers and consumers, who pay
but do not directly select a prescribed drug.31  In particular, the laws ensure
an important role for pharmacists, who are more price-sensitive than doc-
tors.32  Doctors are subject to “a vast array of drug promotion, which includes
detailing (sales calls to doctor’s offices), direct mailings, free drug samples,
medical journal advertising, sponsored continuing medical education pro-
grams, and media advertising.”33  Pharmacists, in contrast, make greater mar-
gins on generics and recommend them to consumers,34 competing with
other pharmacies on price.35
The DPS laws “typically allow pharmacists to substitute generic versions
of brand drugs only if they are ‘AB-rated’ by the FDA.”36  This is solely a
safety regulation, unconcerned with and unresponsive to the requirement’s
effect on competition.  For a generic drug to receive an AB rating, it must be
“therapeutically equivalent” to the brand drug, which means that it “has the
same active ingredient, form, dosage, strength, and safety and efficacy pro-
file.”37  The drug also must be “bioequivalent,” which means “the rate and
extent of absorption in the body is roughly equivalent to the brand drug.”38
28 See, e.g., Norman V. Carroll et al., The Effects of Differences in State Drug Product Selection
Laws on Pharmacists’ Substitution Behavior, 25 MED. CARE 1069 (1987).
29 Carrier, supra note 2, at 1017.
30 See infra Section II.A.
31 BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION: STAFF REPORT TO THE FED-
ERAL TRADE COMMISSION 2–3 (1979); see also In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956,
985 (2003) (“The underlying premise of these [DPS] laws . . . is that generic competition
has the potential to lower prices,” and “these regulations need to be accepted as real mar-
ket factors in an antitrust analysis.”).
32 ALISON MASSON & ROBERT L. STEINER, GENERIC SUBSTITUTION AND PRESCRIPTION
DRUG PRICES: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION LAWS 7 (1985).
33 STUART O. SCHWEITZER, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 87–93 (2d ed.
2007).  For an elaboration on this discussion, see Carrier, supra note 2, at 1017, from which
this passage draws.
34 Shadowen et al., supra note 1, at 16.
35 MASSON & STEINER, supra note 32, at 7; see generally Carrier, supra note 2, at 1017–18.
36 Carrier, supra note 2, at 1018.
37 Orange Book Preface: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,
CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/ucm079068.htm (36th ed. last updated June 10,
2016).
38 See id.  For an elaboration on this discussion, see Carrier, supra note 2, at 1018, from
which this passage draws.
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Product-hopping schemes exploit this regulation.  By making minor
changes to the original product—for example, switching from a capsule to a
tablet, or from a 10-mg to a 12-mg dose—the brand can prevent the generic
from obtaining the AB rating the generic needs to be substituted for the
brand.  After the brand’s reformulation, the generic cannot be substituted
for the new version.  To become substitutable it must start the FDA approval
process all over again.  And while the generic may eventually obtain an AB
rating to the reformulated product, such a showing likely will not occur for
years as the generic reformulates its product, seeks FDA approval, and typi-
cally files a Paragraph-IV certification, which tends to be “followed by the
brand firm’s automatic ‘thirty month stay’ of FDA approval and additional
delays from patent litigation.”39  All of these delays prevent the effective
operation of the DPS laws, removing the role of pharmacists and depriving
consumers of the practical opportunity to consider a lower-priced generic
version of the drug.
D. Timing of Generic Entry
A seminal event in the lifecycle of a prescription drug is generic entry.
When multiple generics enter the market, the price falls to a fraction of the
brand price.40  Brand firms thus have every incentive to delay the entry of
generic competition as long as possible.  The dramatic effects of generic
entry explain the crucial role played by the Hatch-Waxman Act and state DPS
laws.  And they shed light on the essential characteristic, in the product-hop-
ping context, of the timing of generic entry.
Put simply, the brand firm will be much more successful in forestalling
generic competition if it can switch the market to the reformulated drug
before a generic of the original product enters the market.41  Without a
generic on the market, the brand’s heavy promotion and marketing artillery
can convince doctors to prescribe the reformulated drug.  If the brand suc-
cessfully switches the market to the reformulated product before the generic
enters, the generic entry is of no practical significance: there are few or no
prescriptions for the original product for which the generic can be
substituted.42
Several examples demonstrate the crucial role of timing, in particular
the brand’s recognition of its dramatically higher success if it can switch the
39 Carrier, supra note 2, at 1018.
40 Generic Competition and Drug Prices, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm129385.htm
(last updated May 13, 2015); see generally Fiona Scott Morton & Margaret Kyle, Markets for
Pharmaceutical Products, in 2 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 763, 792–93 (Mark V. Pauly
et al. eds., 2012) (summarizing recent studies on generic penetration rates and prices).
41 See Shadowen et al., supra note 1, at 51 (explaining how introduction of reformu-
lated product before generic entry ensures that not only will there be almost no competi-
tion on price but also that there will be almost no competition on quality).
42 For a discussion of why managed care organizations are not able to solve the prob-
lem, see infra note 113.
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market to the reformulated drug before a generic version of the original
drug enters the market.  In the TriCor case, discussed below,43 the brand firm
predicted that it would sell more than ten times as many tablets if it was able to
switch doctors to the reformulated product before the generic version of the
original product entered the market.44  Another example involved a confi-
dential analysis of a product for which projected sales would be three times
higher if the reformulation (replacing a twice-daily version with a once-a-day
version) occurred two years before the generic of the original product
entered the market.45  Another brand firm acknowledged that “its reformula-
tion was ‘a gimmick’ and that switching the market before generic entry was
the ‘cardinal’ determinant of success.”46
Similar testimony in a different case referred to a “[t]otal [d]isaster” if
the reformulated product was introduced after the generic of the original
product entered the market.47  The brand’s internal documents in the hear-
ing in the Namenda case, discussed below,48 revealed that “if we do the hard
switch and . . . convert patients and caregivers to once-a-day therapy versus
twice a day, it’s very difficult for the generics then to reverse-commute
back.”49  And a recent empirical review of product hops concluded that
“after a patient is on the new drug and the old drug has gone generic, the
new brand did not lose share,” which was true “regardless of clinical
differentiation.”50
The European Commission (EC) also recognized the importance of tim-
ing in its Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, which addressed obstacles
blocking generic entry.51  The EC concluded that brands would suffer
reduced prices and sales if generics entered the market earlier than, or at the
same time as, the reformulated product.52  Brands thus viewed it as “of [the]
utmost importance . . . to bring the follow-on product on the market before
the first product effectively loses exclusivity.”53  And the brand firm is able to
facilitate such a switch by “channeling . . . demand from the first product to
the follow-on product” and by “delay[ing] or prevent[ing] generic entry for
the sensitive period of the product switch.”54  For 13 of the 22 second-genera-
tion products mentioned in the report, the reformulated product was
43 See infra Section III.A.
44 Shadowen et al., supra note 1, at 52.
45 Id. at 53.
46 Id. (footnote omitted).
47 Meijer, Inc. v. Barr Pharm., Inc., 572 F. Supp. 2d 38, 43 (D.D.C. 2008).
48 See infra Section III.E.
49 New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787 F.3d 638, 656 (2d Cir.
2015).
50 AARON GAL, WHY DOES LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT STILL WORK? 3 (2013).
51 EUROPEAN COMM’N, PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY FINAL REPORT ¶ 3 (2009),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper
_part1.pdf.
52 Id. ¶ 1010.
53 Id.
54 Id. ¶ 1011.
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launched before the first lost its exclusivity,55 with an average lead time of 17
months.56
Suggesting a reason for this timing, the report included multiple telling
comments from drug companies.  One explained that “the switch rate is dra-
matically reduced” if generics enter at the time of, or before, the introduc-
tion of the second-generation product.57  Along similar lines, another brand
firm conceded that “each patient that is not switched quickly enough” to the
second-generation product is “forever lost to the generics.”58  On the other
side, as a third brand firm admitted: “Once the patient is switched to [the
new product] the physician does not have to, cannot and will not switch him
to a generic, and . . . more important: the pharmacist cannot substitute!!”59
In short, the timing of a product hop is a crucial factor in a brand’s
ability to switch the market to a reformulated drug.  It is therefore critical to
incorporate timing into an appropriate antitrust analysis of product
hopping.60
Moreover, the outsized importance of timing provides evidence that the
high prices in many prescription drug markets result not from valuable inno-
vations, but from market failure.  If these markets were competitive, it would
make little difference that the generic of the original product beat the refor-
mulated brand product to the market, or vice-versa.  A competitive market
would make the same adjustment in either circumstance, probably with a
modest first-mover or incumbent advantage.  The fact that beating the
generic to the market results in a three- or ten-fold increase in sales strongly
suggests that these markets have quite significant imperfections.  An appro-
priate antitrust analysis must also take this unique industry characteristic into
account.
We now explore additional evidence of that market failure.
55 Id. ¶ 1030 fig.138.
56 Id. ¶ 1031.
57 Id. ¶ 1025.
58 Id. ¶ 1028.
59 Id.; see also Abuse of a Dominant Position by Reckitt Benckiser Healthcare (UK)
Ltd. & Reckitt Benckiser Grp., PLC, Case CE/8931/08, ¶ 2.194 (Office of Fair Trading
Apr. 12, 2011) (Eng.), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/555de4bbe5274a70
84000156/rb-decision.pdf (quoting numerous documents in which brand insisted that “we
must implement [the product hop] . . . before a generic name is granted”); Case T–321/
05, AstraZeneca v. European Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. II-2830, 3108 (“Astra intended to
launch Losec MUPS before generic omeprazole products entered the market in large
volumes and drove prices down to lower levels.”).  For an elaboration on this discussion,
see Carrier, supra note 2, at 1021.
60 One commentator has suggested that whether patients will switch back after a
generic becomes available is an empirical question “that has not yet been tested.”  Daniel
A. Crane, Provigil: A Commentary, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 453, 454 (2011).  But the
European Commission’s final report and a comprehensive product-hopping article,
Shadowen et al., supra note 1, were published two years earlier and extensively quoted
industry sources on the issue.  The Namenda litigation has also now revealed additional
data establishing that substantial percentages of patients will not switch back to the original
drug. See infra Section III.E.
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II. MARKET FAILURE
Understanding market failure in the pharmaceutical industry is impor-
tant in determining the appropriate role for antitrust law.  As we discuss in
Section A, a “price disconnect” distinguishes prescription drugs from other
products, separating the price/quality determination that is unified in other
markets.  Section B focuses on pharmaceutical patents, highlighting the lim-
ited and incomplete role played by the patent system.  Section C then pro-
vides several indicia of market failure based on medical evidence, the price of
patented drugs in Mexico (where a prescription is not required), U.S. prices
before prescriptions were required, post-patent prices in the United States,
and lower prices in countries that have addressed the disconnect.  Given that
the United States has not utilized the means employed in other countries to
respond to the disconnect, Section D highlights the importance of antitrust
law.
A. The Price Disconnect
Many prescription drug markets in the United States fail to deliver inno-
vative drugs at reasonable prices because the markets suffer from a market
failure.  Fundamentally, these markets are characterized by a price disconnect:
the doctor who prescribes the product does not pay for it, and the consumer
(or her insurer) who pays for it does not choose it.  In these markets, con-
sumers do not make the fundamental trade-off between price and quality,
and it is this balancing or trading-off that makes markets function well.
In well-functioning markets, large numbers of consumers are personally
knowledgeable about the comparative quality and attributes of competing
products, and those same consumers are themselves responsible for paying
for the products.  Being both knowledgeable and responsible for paying, con-
sumers decide whether the quality and attributes of a particular product
make it worth paying a higher price than for other products in the market.
Competition for the dollars of knowledgeable, paying consumers keeps
prices at competitive levels.61
In a competitive market with knowledgeable and price-sensitive consum-
ers, a firm can reap a price premium above the competitive level only if, and
only to the extent that, it provides a product with characteristics that those con-
sumers value.  For example, if Product A is sold at a monopoly price of $50,
and a competitor introduces Product B, which is the same quality and has
essentially the same attributes as Product A, but with some relatively modest
“new and improved” aspects, the price should fall to, say, $25 for Product A
61 See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 80 (16th ed.
1998) (asserting that choice and utility theory are founded on “the fundamental premise
that people tend to choose those goods and services they value most highly” (emphasis
omitted)); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 1 at 3 (2003) http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/
10/innovationrpt.pdf (arguing that increased consumer welfare results from “the opti-
mum mix of products and services in terms of price, quality, and consumer choice”).
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and $30 for Product B.  Competitive entry drives down the price of the prod-
ucts to the extent of their overlapping quality and attributes, while Product B
can command a price premium only for its “new and improved” aspects.
Competition allows consumers to reap the full benefit of both price competi-
tion and innovation.
Prescription drug markets are different.  Consumers are not knowledge-
able buyers of prescription drugs.  State drug-safety laws prevent consumers
from buying the drugs without a permission slip—a prescription—from their
doctors.  But the doctor who chooses which product the consumer will buy
does not herself have to pay for it.  So the person who chooses does not pay,
and the person who pays does not choose. No one makes the price/quality
decision or trade-off that ensures that manufacturers sell products at compet-
itive prices.62
The price disconnect makes product hopping a viable competition-
impairment strategy in prescription drug markets.  This is shown with a sim-
ple, stylized example.  Assume that a brand manufacturer competes in an
ordinary, not-price-disconnected market.  Assume further that the brand cur-
rently makes $200 million in annual sales of the product; that the research
and development (R&D) costs of redesigning the product are $20 million;
and that redesigning the product in fact would not improve it and therefore
would not result in any sales above $200 million.  The manufacturer would
not redesign the product because the redesign would: (1) not increase sales;
(2) not impair competition; and (3) cost $20 million, resulting in a net loss.
Now assume the same facts, except that the redesign would significantly
impair competition from generics, preventing them from taking $160 million
of the $200 million in existing sales.  In this situation, the manufacturer has a
strong incentive to redesign the product even though it is in fact not an
improvement that would entice consumers to buy more or pay more.  If the
manufacturer redesigns the product, the R&D costs are an investment not in
improving consumer welfare, but in impairing competition.
62 The “price disconnect” market failure in prescription drug markets has been recog-
nized in the economics literature since at least the early 1960s.  See, e.g., STAFF OF S. COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST & MONOPOLY, 87TH CONG., REP. ON ADMINIS-
TERED PRICES: DRUGS 3 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter ADMINISTERED PRICES]; RONALD S.
BOND & DAVID F. LEAN, FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF REPORT ON SALES, PROMOTION, AND
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION IN TWO PRESCRIPTION DRUG MARKETS 75 (1977); BUREAU OF
CONSUMER PROT., supra note 31, at 2–3; MASSON & STEINER, supra note 32, at 5; Shadowen
et al., supra note 1, at 9 n.31 (summarizing economics literature).  And it was introduced in
the legal literature in the late 2000s. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 2, at 1011; Bengt Domeij,
Anticompetitive Marketing in the Context of Pharmaceutical Switching in Europe, in JOSEF DREXL &
NARI LEE, PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW 273, 282 (2013);
Richard Gilbert, Holding Innovation to an Antitrust Standard, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 47,
66 (2007); Shadowen et al., supra note 1, at 9.  Although some courts have ignored the
price disconnect, the Second Circuit recognized it in the Namenda decision discussed
below.  New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787 F.3d 638, 645–46 (2d
Cir. 2015); see infra Section III.E.
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B. Drug Patents’ Role
There is a general misperception that the high prices of prescription
drugs in the United States are the natural (and earned) result of patents.
The government grants a patent on an innovative product, so the argument
goes, and high prices and profits are the inventor’s just reward for develop-
ing that product.
Antitrust scrutiny of prescription drug product hops is needed, however,
because high prices and profits might be the result not of valued innovations,
but of the exploitation of market failures.  The granting of a patent by the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) certainly does not guarantee, or
even suggest, that the reformulated product is superior in any way to existing
products.  The PTO requires only that the product be “novel[]”63 and “non-
obvious,”64 not that it be an improvement.  The Federal Circuit has
explained that “[f]inding that an invention is an ‘improvement’ is not a pre-
requisite to patentability,” as “[i]t is possible for an invention to be less effec-
tive than existing devices but nevertheless meet the statutory criteria for
patentability.”65  Under this standard, the PTO routinely grants patents on
minor differences in existing chemical entities, such as different crystalline
forms of a chemical, or different formulations that do not necessarily
improve the product in any meaningful way.66  Likewise, before approving a
new product for marketing, the FDA requires that the product be superior
only to a placebo, not to existing products.67
In competitive markets, patents do not always, or even usually, create the
ability to charge supracompetitive prices.68  Patent law simply prevents others
from using or making the exact same (or very similar) invention.  Competi-
tors can offer consumers similar products that perform the same function in
an analogous way, and this competition is typically sufficient to keep market
prices at or near the competitive level.
This competition point is crucial.  Society grants patents to inventors as
an inducement for them to innovate and bring valuable new products to the
market.  But in an otherwise competitive market, a patent will allow the man-
63 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
64 Id. § 103.
65 Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., 807 F.2d 955, 960 n.12 (Fed. Cir.
1986); see also Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 393 (1960)
(discussing “the unsound notion that to be patentable an invention must be better than
the prior art”).
66 See, e.g., Forest Labs., Inc. v. Ivax Pharm., Inc., 501 F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(upholding patent on enantiomers); Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (upholding a patent on a particular salt); AstraZeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 384
F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (upholding a formulation patent).
67 See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming,
87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 709 (2009) (noting that the FDA “has neither the mandate nor the
power to take competition concerns into account in approving particular pharmaceutical
products”); Jeanne Whalen, Glaxo Strategy Threatened by FDA Delays, WALL ST. J., June 17,
2008, at B3.
68 See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
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ufacturer to price the product above the competitive level only if and to the
extent that the patented technology reflects a real, valuable innovation for which
knowledgeable, price-sensitive consumers are willing to pay a premium.69
The vast majority of products protected by patents or other IP rights
command little or no premium price in the market, precisely because most
markets are otherwise competitive.70  While some consumers strongly prefer
one brand over the other—indeed, wouldn’t want the other brand if it were
given away for free—most consumers would not pay a price premium for one
over the other.71  The result is that consumers are able to obtain many pat-
ented products at competitive prices despite the manufacturers’ extensive IP
rights.
These same principles would apply in prescription drug markets if they
were otherwise competitive.  The additional profits arising from a pharma-
ceutical patent would reflect the additional consumer value created by the
invention covered by the patent.  As in the example above, the entry of a new
competing pill that provided the same medical benefits as an existing pill
would drive the market price down toward the competitive level, and the new
pill could command a premium over that competitive price only if and to the
extent that it had some patented attribute for which a substantial number of
knowledgeable and price-sensitive consumers were willing to pay a premium.
For example, if the new product were in capsule form while the existing com-
petitor were a tablet, the new entry would drive the market price down, and
the new entrant would enjoy a price premium, only if and to the extent that
consumers who paid out of their own pockets were willing to pay a price
premium for the patented capsule (e.g., if it was substantially easier to
swallow).
Of course, the key here is the important qualification “in an otherwise
competitive market.”  Given the price disconnect, there is no a priori reason
to think that the high prices of many prescription drugs reflect an efficient
reward that society intentionally granted to inventors in exchange for valua-
ble innovations.  Those prices instead might well reflect a market failure that
society unintentionally created as a by-product of drug-safety regulations—
the prescription requirement.
C. Evidence of Market Failure
Determining whether the high prices in prescription drug markets are
the result of valuable innovations or market failure is vitally important.  If the
69 See Arjun Jayadev & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Two Ideas to Increase Innovation and Reduce
Pharmaceutical Costs and Prices, 28 HEALTH AFF. 165 (2008); Panos Kanavos & Uwe Rein-
hardt, Reference Pricing for Drugs: Is It Compatible with U.S. Health Care?, 22 HEALTH AFF. 16, 21
(2003); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J.
1693, 1707 (2008).
70 See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 28; Christopher R. Leslie, Patent Tying, Price Dis-
crimination, and Innovation, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 811, 823 (2011).
71 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke?
Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055 (2012).
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high prices are the consequence of innovation in an otherwise competitive
market, society should accept those prices as the presumably efficient cost of
rewarding inventors for valuable new products.  But if the high prices result
from market failure, society should not blindly accept them but should try to
prevent manufacturers from exploiting the market failure.
The available evidence indicates that the high prices in many drug cate-
gories result from market failure rather than valuable innovations.  This
includes medical evidence—that many drugs perform essentially the same
function in the same way—as well as an array of economic evidence, includ-
ing data from circumstances where prescription drugs are patented but the
price disconnect does not exist.  Without the price disconnect, drug patents
often do not result in high returns for the inventor.72
1. Medical Evidence
In a recent five-year period, 67% of the “new” drugs approved by the
FDA were “me-too” drugs—drugs that are slight chemical variants of their
predecessor and that produce essentially the same medical results in
patients.73  With four or five me-too branded drugs available, in a competi-
tive market the price on all of these drugs should be competed down to the
equilibrium level.  But that is not what happens.  Instead, the entry of the
second and third competitors, and even the fourth and fifth, rarely results in
competitive prices.  The industry’s profit pie does not get substantially
smaller; it just gets split among more manufacturers.  Doctors might pre-
scribe one of the me-too drugs rather than another, but consumers pay
supracompetitive prices regardless of which prescription they get.  It is only
competition from generic drugs that typically causes the average price of the
molecule to drop toward competitive levels, and the generic competition has
72 The market failure caused by the price disconnect in the United States is exacer-
bated by the shielding of consumers from direct responsibility to pay for prescription
drugs.  As a result of private, employer-sponsored, and government insurance, by 2010
consumers directly paid only 8% of the total costs of prescription drugs.  Morton & Kyle,
supra note 40, at 788.  This compares to 70% in 1980. Id.  The consumer-patient today is
removed in large part from the economics of the prescription decision.  The physician
mainly decides what drug is used, and the third-party insurer, whether private or public,
pays most of the bill.
73 Our analysis of FDA data shows that from 2011 through 2015, the FDA approved
548 NDAs, only 182 (33%) of which were for New Molecular Entities.  Of those 182 NMEs,
the FDA gave priority review (which is reserved for drugs that treat a serious condition and
provide a significant improvement in safety or effectiveness) to only 90.  Thus, just 16% of
NDA approvals were for truly innovative drugs.  Previous analyses came to similar conclu-
sions. See, e.g., MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY
DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 53–56 (2005) (analyzing data for the period from
1998 to 2002).  Our figures might overstate the rate of innovation for standard prescrip-
tion drugs, because we include data for biologics.
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that effect only for its AB-rated branded counterpart, not for other branded
drugs in the therapeutic class.74
Perhaps the most infamous example is presented by the GERD/heart-
burn therapeutic class.  This consists of “proton pump inhibitors” (PPIs),
including Prilosec, Prevacid, Protonix, Aciphex, and Nexium, which ease the
symptoms of chronic indigestion.  In the early 2000s, this class “feature[d]
competition among five branded products, all of which treat[ed] essentially
the same conditions and did so equally effectively—they were all “me too”
versions of Prilosec.”75  The entry of multiple, nearly identical branded com-
petitors did not cause the price of PPIs to fall substantially.  Instead, the net
prices (after including rebates and discounts) remained high, with each of
the competitors making sales in the hundreds of millions of dollars annu-
ally.76  As demonstrated by the prices charged by generic versions of the
drugs, the brands were sold at net prices more than 25 times their marginal
costs of production.77
A market consisting of “five close functional substitutes could not yield
margins anywhere near that magnitude if consumers made the relevant
price/quality choices.”78  The astronomically high price of me-too drugs in
crowded therapeutic classes is strong evidence that the prices result from
market failure, not from valued innovations.
2. Prices of Patented Drugs in Mexico
The prices of drugs that are patented but not subject to a price discon-
nect provide further data to determine whether high drug prices result from
valuable innovations or market failure.  In these circumstances, high prices
could potentially reflect innovations valued by consumers in a competitive
market.  On the other hand, lower prices would provide further evidence
that patented “innovations” do not command a price premium in the
74 Transcript of Record at 123–26, In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 309
F.R.D. 107 (D. Mass. 2015) (No. 12-md-02409) (testimony of Richard Fante) (on file with
authors); id. at 79–84 (testimony of Dr. Meredith Rosenthal) (on file with authors); id. at
88–92 (testimony of Linda Palczuk) (on file with authors).
75 Shadowen et al., supra note 1, at 69; see, e.g., STANLEY IP ET AL., AGENCY FOR HEALTH-
CARE RES. & QUALITY, PUB. NO. 06-EHC003-EF, COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF MANAGE-
MENT STRATEGIES FOR GASTROESOPHAGEAL REFLUX DISEASE 35 (2005), http://effective
healthcare.ahrq.gov/reports/final.cfm (finding no differences in effectiveness of equal
doses of omeprazole, esomeprazole, lansoprazole, pentoprazole, and rabeoprazole);
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, Pub. No. 06-EHC003-A, Comparing Health Care
Choices: Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease (GERD) (2005), http://effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/
repfiles/consumer.gastro.pdf (“Studies show that, overall, each PPI works about as well as
another for relieving symptoms.”); See also generally ANGELL, supra note 72, at 74–93
(explaining “me-too” drugs and using PPIs as an example).
76 Transcript of Record at 70–74, In re Nexium, 309 F.R.D. 107 (No. 12-md-02409) (tes-
timony of Dr. Meredith Rosenthal).
77 Id. at 83–84.  Accounting data have shown that brands’ profit margins, even includ-
ing R&D and marketing in the costs, are 70%. Id. at 86.
78 Shadowen et al., supra note 1, at 70.
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absence of the price disconnect.  It is the market failure, not valued innova-
tion, that is generating the monopoly power.
Prescription drug markets in Mexico provide just such an experiment.
For the most part, major prescription drugs patented in the United States
also are patented in Mexico.79  Until 2010, however, many patented drugs
that require a prescription in the United States did not require a prescription
in Mexico (or pharmacies routinely dispensed the drugs without requiring
prescriptions).80  For these drugs, in the United States there were patents
and prescriptions (and thus a price disconnect), but in Mexico there were
patents and no prescriptions (and no price disconnect).  In Mexico, consum-
ers simply walked into a pharmacy, chose for themselves which patented drug
to buy, and paid for it out of their own pockets.81
Studies of comparative prices of brand, on-patent pharmaceuticals in the
two countries consistently found during the relevant time period that prices
in Mexico were substantially lower.82  For example, a study comparing prices
in El Paso, Texas, and its sister city, Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, found, after con-
trolling for exchange rates, that retail prices were on average 29% lower in
Juarez.83  The study noted that consumers could buy these patented drugs
79 ELÍAS MIZRAHI ALVO, CEPAL DE MEX., SERIE ESTUDIOS Y PERSPECTIVAS NO. 121, REGU-
LACIÓN Y COMPETENCIA EN EL MERCADO DE MEDICAMENTOS: EXPERIENCIAS RELEVANTES PARA
AMÉRICA LATINA 8, 38 (2010).
80 THOMAS M. FULLERTON JR. & OSVALDO MIRANDA, UNIV. TEX. EL PASO, TECH. REP.
TX10-1, ARE BRAND NAME MEDICINE PRICES REALLY LOWER IN CIUDAD JUAREZ? 9 (2010); José
A. Pagán et al., Self-Medication and Health Insurance Coverage in Mexico, 75 HEALTH POL’Y 170,
170–71 (2006); Peter Temin, Technology, Regulation, and Market Structure in the Modern Phar-
maceutical Industry, 10 BELL J. ECON. 429, 434 (1979); Pierre Moı̈se & Elizabeth Docteur,
Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Policies in Mexico 43–44 (Org. for Econ. Coopera-
tion & Dev. Health Working Paper No. 25, 2007).  Beginning in 2010, Mexico required
prescriptions for large numbers of medicines. See COMISIÓN FEDERAL PARA LA PROTECCIÓN
CONTRA RIESGOS SANITARIOS, Guı́a para el Cumplimiento del “Acuerdo por el que se
Determinan los Lineamientos a los que estará Sujeta la Venta y Dispensación de Antibiót-
icos” (2010) (guide issued by Mexican government to pharmacies outlining the require-
ments of Article 226 of Mexico’s Public Health Code, which took effect on August 25,
2010).  Many pharmacies, however, countered that measure by having on-site doctors who
would write prescriptions for a nominal fee. See Nuria Homedes & Antonio Ugalde, Mexi-
can Pharmacies: Benefits and Risks for Border Residents in the United States of America and Mexico,
33 REV. PANAM SALUD PUBLICA 196, 201–02 (2013).
81 See, e.g., ERNESTO ENRIQUEZ RUBIO ET AL., HACIA UNA POLÍTICA FARMACÉUTICA INTE-
GRAL PARA MÉXICO 79 (2005) (noting that, even for drugs requiring a prescription, 43% of
purchases were made without one).  Before 2010, various government plans paid for
approximately 40% of prescription drugs in Mexico. See David J. Cantor, Prescription Drug
Price Comparisons: The United States, Canada, and Mexico, in THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY:
ACCESS AND OUTLOOK 45, 47 (Ethan N. Parvis ed., 2002).  We do not include the prices of
those drugs in our analysis.
82 See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon & Michael F. Furukawa, Prices and Availability of
Pharmaceuticals: Evidence from Nine Countries, HEALTH AFF. ONLINE, Oct. 29, 2003, at W3-521,
W3-527 Ex. 4.
83 FULLERTON & MIRANDA, supra note 80, at 8–9, 14 tbl.3; Temin, supra note 80, at 434.
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without a prescription in Mexico but required a prescription in the United
States.84
The Mexican experience provides additional evidence that, holding pat-
ents constant, prices are consistently and substantially higher when prescrip-
tions are required.  This again strongly suggests that market failure, not
valuable innovation, causes supracompetitive drug prices.85
3. Non-Prescription Prices in the United States
Another example of market failure is provided by drug prices in the
United States before the law required prescriptions.
In 1938, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) created for
the first time a distinction between prescription and over-the-counter
drugs.86  A leading historian of the industry discerned the beginnings of the
price disconnect:
As the number of prescription drugs increased . . . the marketing of drugs
was directed more and more at the medical profession.  These new “custom-
ers” had a peculiar characteristic; they did not pay for the drugs they
ordered.  In fact, they often did not even know how much these drugs cost.
As a result, the demand for prescription drugs was more inelastic than it
would have been without the FDA’s regulation on prescription sales.87
In 1951, the FDA began routinely designating drugs as “for prescription
use only.”88  The manufacturers quickly took advantage of this safety-based
interposition of a doctor between the consumer and the product choice.  In
1954, the brands formed a trade association, the National Pharmaceutical
84 FULLERTON & MIRANDA, supra note 80, at 9.
85 To be clear, we do not suggest that prescriptions are undesirable from a safety per-
spective, but instead that they create a price disconnect between doctor and payor.
86 Temin, supra note 80, at 434.
87 Id.; see also DONALD C. KING, MARKETING PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 10 (1968) (“[I]n the
purchase of prescription drugs, the consumer is unable to protect himself against the ele-
ment of monopoly inherent in trademarking by choosing from among a number of com-
peting brands.”); Peter Temin, The Origin of Compulsory Drug Prescriptions, 22 J.L. & ECON.
91 (1979).
88 From 1906 to 1938, the FDA had closely regulated some narcotics and had required
certain information in product labels, though consumers were free to choose whatever
pharmaceutical concoctions they desired.  Temin, supra note 87, at 91.  But in 1937, more
than 100 people died from taking Massengill’s Elixir of Sulfanilamide, which had been
manufactured with an untested, and poisonous, solvent. See id. at 94–95.  In response to
public outcry, Congress passed the FDCA, which revised the original 1906 Act. See id. at
91–94.  In addition to requiring new drugs to prove their safety prior to marketing, the Act
required drugs to have expanded labels with adequate directions for safe use.  From 1938
to 1951, the FDA used this provision of the FDCA to extend its regulatory reach by ruling
that some drugs could not be labeled for safe use because consumers lacked sufficient
expertise to comprehend the label and that those drugs could be sold only through a
doctor’s prescription. See generally Temin, supra note 87.  The 1951 Durham-Humphrey
Amendment to the FDCA extended the FDA’s right to designate pharmaceuticals “for pre-
scription use only.” See id.  Today, there are thousands of pharmaceuticals that can be
purchased only after obtaining a doctor’s prescription.
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Council (NPC), whose first concerted effort was to lobby state boards of phar-
macy to tighten their substitution laws.89
Those laws had previously allowed pharmacists in some circumstances to
substitute among brands of the same type of prescription drug, prohibiting
only substitution of one type of drug for another.90  For example, a pharma-
cist receiving a prescription for Eli Lilly’s erythromycin could substitute Pfi-
zer’s oleandomycin, which had a different chemical structure but performed
essentially the same antibiotic function.  The pre-1954 substitution laws
merely prevented the pharmacist who received a prescription for an antibi-
otic such as erythromycin from substituting an aspirin.91
Under intense NPC lobbying, 44 state boards of pharmacy had by 1959
changed their substitution laws to prohibit substitution of one manufac-
turer’s brand for another’s.92  The manufacturers simultaneously began
intensifying their marketing to doctors, encouraging them to write prescrip-
tions for a particular branded drug rather than for a drug class.93  These
changes “combined to prestructure a more favorable context for high profit-
ability.”94  Congressional hearings from 1957 to 1963 examined high drug
prices and led to the conclusion that the new state restrictions on substitu-
tion heightened the price disconnect and monopoly power.  The Senate
Report discussed the disconnect and its economic effects:
Regardless of how well intentioned the physician may be, another party can
never be expected to be as interested in price as the individual who has to
spend his own money.  Once the physician has written his prescription (usu-
ally in terms of a brand name), the consumer is limited to the product pre-
scribed under that brand name; he cannot “shop around” for the same
product under a different (or no) brand name at a lower price.  Hence in
[prescription] drugs the ability of the ordinary consumer to protect himself
against the monopoly element inherent in trademarks by being able to
choose from a number of competing brands is nonexistent.  The consumer
is “captive” to a degree not present in any other industry.95
The constriction in state substitution laws, together with the manufactur-
ers’ “remarkable success in persuading physicians to prescribe by trade
names rather than generic names,” resulted in “the opportunity for price
competition disappear[ing].”96  This was true “regardless of whether the
drugs are patented or non-patented.”97
89 See HOWARD ALDRICH, ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS 146 (2008).
90 Paul M. Hirsch, Organizational Effectiveness and the Institutional Environment, 20
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 327, 332–33 (1975).
91 ADMINISTERED PRICES, supra note 62, at 235.
92 Id. at 236.
93 Hirsch, supra note 90, at 336; see generally ADMINISTERED PRICES, supra note 62, at
235–38.
94 Hirsch, supra note 90, at 336.
95 ADMINISTERED PRICES, supra note 62, at 3.
96 Id. at 223.
97 Id.
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Not surprisingly, economic historians have traced the rise of “Big
Pharma” and the industry’s outsized profits to exactly this time period in
which regulations were introduced requiring a prescription and limiting sub-
stitutability.98  By “restrict[ing] the sale of some drugs (including almost all
of the new drugs) to prescription sales,” the FDA “reduc[ed] sharply the elas-
ticity of demand.”99
4. Post-Patent Prices in the United States
Just as history shows that the price disconnect, not patents, sharply
reduced cross-price elasticity, so too does history show that prices remain
inelastic when patents expire but the price disconnect remains.
In 1984, Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act to streamline the
entry of generic drugs.100  The legislature’s fundamental premise in enacting
the statute was that, even after patents had expired, competition among
branded pharmaceuticals was insufficient to drive prices to competitive
levels.  Congress understood that only competition from generic drugs could
bring about competitive prices.101
Due to then-applicable FDA requirements that generic manufacturers
duplicate the brand’s clinical studies, as of 1983 only 35% of branded drugs
that were off-patent faced generic competition.102  The fundamental eco-
nomic premise upon which Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act was
that, even after patents expired, brands were continuing to sell at supracompetitive
levels and only generic competition could generate competitive prices.103  In Senator
Hatch’s words, the Act was designed to “significantly lower the price of off-
98 See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SHAPING THE INDUSTRIAL CENTURY: THE REMARKA-
BLE STORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN CHEMICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES
179–80 (2005); KING, supra note 87, at 21 tbl.5 (industry sales, in dollars, nearly quadru-
pled from 1946 to 1960); TOM MAHONEY, THE MERCHANTS OF LIFE: AN ACCOUNT OF THE
AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 4 (1959) (“As late as 1939 no ethical drug manufac-
turer in America had a sales volume as large as a department store like Macy’s in New York
or Hudson’s in Detroit.”); Temin, supra note 80, at 443–44.
99 Temin, supra note 80, at 443–44.
100 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, 35 U.S.C.).
101 Richard E. Caves et al., Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceu-
tical Industry, 1991 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1, 10.
102 Id.; Carrier, supra note 12, at 49; see generally H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 17
(1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2650.
103 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 17 (“Currently, there are approximately 150
drugs approved after 1962 that are off patent and for which there is no generic
equivalent . . . . The availability of generic versions of pioneer drugs approved after 1962
would save American consumers $920 million over the next 12 years.”); id. pt. 2, at 4, as
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2688 (“The FDA rules on generic drug approval for
drugs approved after 1962 have had serious anti-competitive effects.  The net result of
these rules has been the practical extension of the monopoly position of the patent holder
beyond the expiration of the patent.  This is so because of the inability of generics to
obtain approval for these post-1962 drugs without enormous expenditures of money for
duplicative tests.”).  Generic competition usually erodes the market power of only the
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patent drugs, by many times in some cases, through increased generic
competition.”104
In short, the entire premise of Hatch-Waxman’s generic-encouraging
provisions is that the market fails to generate adequate price competition
among branded alternatives, even when the brand drugs are off patent.
Once again, the price disconnect, not patents, permits supracompetitive
prices.  Generic competition is necessary precisely because the price discon-
nect creates a significant market failure.
5. Prices When the Disconnect Is Solved
Finally, many jurisdictions outside the United States require prescrip-
tions but have taken effective action to reconnect the price/quality decision.
The success of these price-reconnection techniques in delivering competitive
prices again points to the price disconnect, not valuable innovations, as the
culprit in generating supracompetitive prices in the United States.105
Some nations reunite the drug choice and payment obligation by having
the payor—often a state agency—participate in drug selection by imposing a
formulary or determining reimbursement levels under state-run insurance
plans.  Other nations reunite choice and payment by giving the doctor a
financial stake in the product selection, for example by requiring a prescrip-
tion “budget” and giving the doctor a financial incentive to stay within it.106
Recognizing that the price disconnect is itself the result of government regu-
lation—the requirement that the consumer get a prescription—other
nations directly regulate the price of prescription drugs.107
All of these techniques have been successful in bringing more competi-
tive prices to consumers.  Although methodological issues complicate inter-
national price comparisons, one conclusion is beyond dispute: the prices of
branded prescription drugs in the United States significantly exceed those in
other developed nations.108  By contrast, when there is no price disconnect—
for example, for generic prescription drugs and over-the-counter drugs—the
generic’s AB-rated counterpart, not other drugs in the therapeutic class. See supra note 74
and infra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.
104 130 CONG. REC. 15791, 15847 (1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
105 See Jayadev & Stiglitz, supra note 69; Steve D. Shadowen et al., Bringing Market Disci-
pline to Pharmaceutical Product Reformulations, 41 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION
L. 698 (2011) (including a detailed survey of international price-disconnect remedies).
106 Shadowen et al., supra note 105, at 718–20.
107 Id. at 716–17.
108 See, e.g., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., ACCOUNTING FOR THE COST OF HEALTH CARE IN THE
UNITED STATES (2008); DAVID A. SQUIRES, THE U.S. HEALTH SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE: A COM-
PARISON OF TWELVE INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS 6–7 (2011); Patricia M. Danzon & Michael F.
Furukawa, International Prices and Availability of Pharmaceuticals in 2005, 27 HEALTH AFF. 221,
227–29 (2008); Richard G. Frank, Prescription-Drug Prices, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1375
(2004); Marcio Machado et al., International Drug Price Comparisons: Quality Assessment, 29
REV. PANAM SALUD PUBLICA 46, 49 (2011).
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United States has among the most competitive prices among developed
nations.109
D. Market Failure’s Relevance to Antitrust Analysis
To date, the United States has resisted the regulatory remedies that
other developed nations have applied to the price-disconnect market failure.
Instead, the United States has relied exclusively on two more market-oriented
remedies: generic drugs and antitrust law.
As noted above, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides a pathway for the FDA
to approve the marketing of generic drugs.  The Act has effectively promoted
price competition in limited circumstances.  Generic drugs offer substantial
price competition, but only to the specific branded drug for which the prescription
was written, and only after the patent for that specific drug is no longer in effect.  In a
crowded class of me-too drugs, the entry of a generic version of Brand A will
quickly cause most of the consumers of Brand A to switch to the generic.  But
the price disconnect almost always prevents that generic entry from generat-
ing competitive prices for Brands B, C, D, or E.110
In other words, generic competition may prevent the specific brand
counterpart from extending its monopoly power beyond the expiration of its
patents.  But the price disconnect prevents generic competition from gener-
ating competitive prices within the therapeutic category.  Price competition
exists within only one slice of the therapeutic-category pie, with consumers
unlucky enough to have doctors prescribing other branded drugs in the class
continuing to pay supracompetitive prices.  This is unsurprising given that
this was the limited, stated purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act.111
Through product reformulations, brand firms can disable even this lim-
ited, generic-drug-based, partial remedy to the price disconnect.  U.S. courts
have recently begun subjecting these reformulations to antitrust scrutiny.
Although such scrutiny cannot solve the price-disconnect problem within a
therapeutic class, it can help prevent manufacturers from extending their
market power even after their patents are no longer effective.112
The importance of antitrust’s role in this setting should be apparent.
These markets suffer from a market failure resulting from the price discon-
nect.  This market failure has prompted other developed nations to imple-
109 CHRIS L. PETERSON & RACHEL BURTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34175, U.S.
HEALTH CARE SPENDING: COMPARISON WITH OTHER OECD COUNTRIES 22–24 (2007);
Danzon & Furukawa, supra note 108, at 229–30.
110 See generally E.M. KOLASSA, THE STRATEGIC PRICING OF PHARMACEUTICALS 232 (2009)
(“Generics, in general, devastate the sales only of the originator brand . . . . There is a
misconception that the entrance of a generic into a market will affect the shares and use of
other products in the category as well.  We have not found this to be true in most cases.”);
see also supra note 74 (citing testimony from Nexium antitrust litigation).
111 See supra Section I.B.
112 Preventing this extension of market power (often after the brand has received non-
patent exclusivities and a 30-month stay) would promote a central purpose of the Hatch-
Waxman Act: facilitating price competition.
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ment comprehensive regulatory remedies including direct price regulation,
state-run formularies, and financial incentives for prescribing doctors.  The
United States has responded with a market-based solution—the promotion
of generic drugs—that solves only one small part of the problem.  When
manufacturers try to disable even that modest remedy, the United States
again forgoes any comprehensive regulatory solution, but instead relies solely
on the ad hoc application of antitrust law.113
Fortunately, antitrust law is able to consider the regulatory regime, in
this case, the Hatch-Waxman Act, state DPS laws, and the price disconnect.
In Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, the
Supreme Court made clear that courts must take “careful account” of “the
pervasive federal and state regulation characteristic of the industry”114 and
must “recognize and reflect the distinctive economic and legal setting of the
regulated industry to which it applies.”115  In an important case discussed
below,116 the Namenda court relied on this principle in rejecting the argu-
ment that “antitrust law is not a vehicle for enforcing the ‘spirit’ of drug
laws.”117  And the Namenda court specifically recognized that “what Defend-
ants call ‘free riding’ . . . is authorized by law; is the explicit goal of state
substitution laws; and furthers the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act by pro-
moting drug competition and by preventing the ‘practical extension of
[brand drug manufacturers’] monopoly . . . beyond the expiration of the[ir]
patent[s].”118
113 Economic and structural hurdles prevent managed care organizations (MCOs)
from defeating product-hopping schemes. See generally GAL, supra note 50, at 1 (discussing
how a survey of benefit managers revealed that “the top two reasons [that MCOs cannot
defeat product hops] are (i) pharma companies’ resources and ingenuity in addressing
formulary restrictions and (ii) the symbiotic relationship between pharma and managed
care (blocking drug A would lead to lower rebate on drug B)”).  Importantly, a collective
action problem prevents individual MCOs from countering product-hopping schemes. See,
e.g., id. at 6 (“The US payor system is fragmented—a well motivated, organized pharma
company with a portfolio of drugs can effectively overcome payor tools or at least make
them so costly to implement that the payors are forced to the negotiation table.”);
Shadowen et al., supra note 1, at 21 (“An individual MCO’s success in discouraging doctors
from writing scripts for the new product is . . . dependent on the action of its competitors.
Paradoxically, those competitors’ incentive is to do nothing and instead free-ride on
others’ efforts.”).
114 540 U.S. 398, 411–12 (2004) (quoting United States v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 422
U.S. 86, 91 (1975)).
115 Id. (quoting Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990)).
116 See infra Section III.E.
117 New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787 F.3d 638, 658 (2d Cir.
2015).
118 Id. at 657–58 (second, third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (citation omit-
ted) (citing FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013)) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-
857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2688); see also Actavis, 133 S.
Ct. at 2228 (recognizing Hatch-Waxman Act’s bestowal on generics of ability to “piggy-
back” on brand’s approval efforts, which speed “‘the introduction of low-cost generic
drugs to market’ . . . thereby furthering drug competition” (quoting Caraco Pharm. Labs.,
Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012))).
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If any industry requires a specialized, nuanced analysis, it is the pharma-
ceutical industry.  There is market failure, generic drugs can remedy one
small part of the problem, product reformulations can disable even that par-
tial remedy, and antitrust law is the only available means in the United States
of policing reformulations.  We now turn to courts’ analyses of these issues,
which have garnered mixed results in considering the regulatory regime and
understanding the competitive consequences of product hopping.
III. JUDICIAL AND ACADEMIC ANALYSIS
Given the complexity of the relevant economics and market structure, it
is not a surprise that judicial analysis of product hopping has varied widely.
Just as important, the timing of the cases has shaped the development of the
law.  In particular, the factual settings of the first two cases set the stage for
the analysis in later cases.
Section A begins with TriCor, in which the court offered a nuanced anal-
ysis, albeit one that some later courts restricted to “hard switches” (in which
the brand firm removes the old product from the market).  Section B dis-
cusses the Walgreens case, which addressed a “soft switch” (in which the brand
leaves the original product on the market) and offered a simplistic analysis of
consumer choice.
The Suboxone case, addressed in Section C, revealed aspects of both hard
and soft switches, with the court offering a nuanced understanding of the
regulatory regime.  The Mylan case addressed in Section D, in contrast, is an
outlier that completely neglected the regime.  The Namenda opinion,
addressed in Section E, understood the regulatory regime in the context of
hard switches, but overemphasized the distinction between hard and soft
switches and introduced a new, underinclusive framework based on coercion.
While the courts generally have considered the regulatory regime, Section F
discusses the recent work of scholars who have paid less attention to this
context.
A. TriCor: Hard Switch, Nuanced Analysis
In Abbott Laboratories v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (TriCor), the Dela-
ware district court provided the first analysis of product hopping.119  It con-
sidered Abbott’s series of changes to its billion-dollar cholesterol and
triglycerides drug, TriCor.  Abbott marginally lowered the drug’s strength,
switched from a capsule to a tablet, stopped selling capsules, bought back
existing supplies of capsules from pharmacies, and changed the code for cap-
sules in the national drug database to “obsolete.”120  After the generics devel-
oped equivalents for the reformulated tablets, Abbott again transitioned to a
new (marginally lower-strength) tablet, stopped selling the original tablets,
and again changed the database code to “obsolete.”121  In removing the old
119 432 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del. 2006).
120 Id. at 415–16.
121 Id. at 418.
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drugs from the market, Abbott engaged in what has since been deemed a
“hard switch.”
Because of the “nature of the pharmaceutical drug market,” the court
applied the Rule of Reason.122  The defendants’ proposed standard of per se
legality “presuppose[d] an open market where the merits of any new product
[could] be tested by unfettered consumer choice.”123  But in this case the
complaint alleged a price disconnect, and in addition the defendants “alleg-
edly prevented such a choice by removing the old formulations from the
market while introducing new formulations.”124  Both circumstances justified
“an inquiry into the effect of Defendants’ formulation changes.”125
The court did not require the plaintiffs “to prove that the new formula-
tions were absolutely no better than the prior version or that the only pur-
pose of the innovation was to eliminate [generic competition].”126  Rather,
“if Plaintiffs show anticompetitive harm from the formulation changes, that
harm will be weighed against any benefits presented by Defendants.”127
The court also found it irrelevant that the reformulation did not com-
pletely bar the generics from entering the market, but only prevented auto-
matic substitution at the pharmacy counter.128  The analysis asks not whether
exclusionary conduct bars competitors “from all means of distribution,” but
only whether it precludes access to the “cost-efficient ones.”129  While gener-
ics “may be able to market their own branded versions of the old TriCor
formulations, they cannot provide generic substitutes for the current TriCor
formulation, which is alleged to be their cost-efficient means of competing in
the pharmaceutical drug market.”130  Such an opportunity “has allegedly
been prevented entirely by Defendants’ allegedly manipulative and unjustifi-
able formulation changes,” and “[s]uch a restriction on competition, if
proven, is sufficient to support an antitrust claim.”131
In short, in the first judicial treatment of product hopping, the court
offered a thoughtful approach that considered the realities of pharmaceuti-
cal markets—in particular, the existence of the price disconnect and the
importance of generic substitution—and relied on the Rule of Reason in bal-
ancing the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of product hopping.
Some later courts, however, limited the reach of the ruling by cabining its
reasoning to the “hard switch” scenario.
122 Id. at 422.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. (citing HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTI-
TRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 12.5, 15.3c1 (2015)).
126 Id.
127 Id. (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59, 66–67 (D.C. Cir.
2001)).
128 See id. at 423 (citing United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir.
2005)).
129 Id. (quoting Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 64).
130 Id.
131 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-1\NDL104.txt unknown Seq: 28 30-NOV-16 8:35
194 notre dame law review [vol. 92:1
B. Walgreens: Soft Switch, Simplistic Choice
In particular, such a course was shaped by the second case, Walgreen Co.
v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals (Walgreens), which involved AstraZeneca’s con-
version from heartburn drug Prilosec to Nexium.132  The plaintiffs alleged
that there was “almost no difference” between the drugs and there was “no
pharmacodynamic reason” the two forms would have different effects in the
body.133  The plaintiffs also alleged that AstraZeneca “aggressively promoted
and ‘detailed’ Nexium to doctors” while stopping its promotion and detailing
of Prilosec.134  And they claimed that AstraZeneca was able to switch the mar-
ket (to a drug receiving patent protection for an additional thirteen years)
only through “distortion and misdirection in marketing, promoting and
detailing Nexium.”135
Unlike the court in TriCor, the District of Columbia court ignored the
plaintiffs’ detailed allegations of the price disconnect in pharmaceutical mar-
kets.  The court granted AstraZeneca’s motion to dismiss, concluding that
“there is no allegation that AstraZeneca eliminated any consumer
choices.”136  But that conclusion rested on three factual assertions, all of
which required the court to ignore the price disconnect.  The court asserted
as facts that:
[1] AstraZeneca added choices . . . [by] introduc[ing] a new drug to com-
pete with already-established drugs . . .[;]
[2] [D]etermin[ations of] which product among several is superior . . . are
left to the marketplace[; and]
[3] New products are not capable of affecting competitors’ market share
unless consumers prefer the new product.137
Each of those factual assertions contradicted plaintiffs’ allegations
regarding the price disconnect and its effects.  In a price-disconnected mar-
ket, switching doctors’ prescriptions from an original branded product (fac-
ing impending generic competition) to a reformulated product (not facing
generic competition)—what the court called “add[ing] choices”—signifi-
cantly impairs consumers’ ability to choose a generic product.  The “added
choice” of the reformulated product is actually the means by which consum-
ers’ real choice is eliminated.  Moreover, the question is not which product
among several is superior, but rather which product offers the consumer the
best trade-off between price and quality, a determination that “the marketplace”
cannot make in a price-disconnected market.  In fact, the switching of the
market from the original to the reformulated version certainly is capable of
affecting competitors’ market shares despite consumers’ preferences.  The
court’s contrary assertion ignored not only the plaintiffs’ detailed allegations,
132 534 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2008).
133 Id. at 149.
134 Id. (footnote omitted).
135 Id. at 148–49.
136 Id. at 151.
137 Id.
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but also the economic rationale of fifty state DPS statutes and the Hatch-
Waxman Act.138  None of those statutes would be necessary if consumers in
fact revealed their preferences through price/quality choices.
In addressing a soft switch, the court confronted a different scenario
than that in TriCor.  But the divide between hard and soft switches did not
need to be as stark as the court made it.  The die was cast, however, when the
court articulated an analysis of consumer choice that, even if it would make
sense in non-pharmaceutical markets where consumers make the price/qual-
ity tradeoff, does not capture the realities of drug markets.
C. Suboxone: Hard/Soft Switch, Nuanced Analysis
A third court considered elements of both hard and soft switches in a
nuanced analysis of the regulatory regime.  In In re Suboxone Antitrust Litiga-
tion,139 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania court considered allegations that
Reckitt switched the market from opioid dependence-treating Suboxone tab-
lets to sublingual film.  Reckitt allegedly promoted Suboxone film to physi-
cians, disparaged Suboxone tablets, warned of false safety concerns, publicly
announced the removal of tablets for these fabricated safety reasons but did
not remove the tablets until six months later, and raised the price of tablets
in relation to film even though film was more expensive to manufacture and
package.140
The court began its analysis by noting that “[b]ecause ordinarily innova-
tion will also inflict harm upon competitors, ‘courts should not condemn a
product change . . . unless they are relatively confident that the conduct in
question is anticompetitive.’”141  But “when the introduction of a new prod-
uct by a monopolist prevents consumer choice, greater scrutiny is appropri-
ate,”142 with the test (similar to TriCor) for whether conduct is exclusionary
based “not [on] total foreclosure, but whether the challenged practices bar a
substantial number of rivals or severely restrict the market’s ambit.”143
The court found that the conduct at issue “seems to fall somewhere
between that alleged in” Walgreens and TriCor.144  The behavior was more
concerning than that in Walgreens because Reckitt removed tablets from the
market, but less concerning than that in TriCor because Reckitt did not buy
back tablets or label an old product “obsolete.”145  The court made clear that
“simply introducing a new product on the market, whether it is a superior
138 See id.  The district court acknowledged the price disconnect only inadvertently,
alternately identifying patients and doctors as the “consumers” who supposedly did not
suffer the “elimination of consumer choice.” Id. at 151–52.
139 64 F. Supp. 3d 665 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
140 Id. at 674.
141 Id. at 679–80 (second alteration in original) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc. (TriCor), 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 421 (D. Del. 2006)).
142 Id. at 680 (quoting TriCor, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 421).
143 Id. (quoting United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2005)).
144 Id. at 681.
145 Id.
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product or not, does not, by itself, constitute exclusionary conduct.”146
Rather, “[t]he key question is whether the defendant combined the introduc-
tion of a new product with some other wrongful conduct, such that the com-
prehensive effect is likely to stymie competition, prevent consumer choice
and reduce the market’s ambit.”147  Crucially, “[t]his analysis must be under-
taken with the somewhat unique characteristics of the pharmaceutical mar-
ket in mind.”148
Applying this analysis, the court found that “the facts presented suffi-
ciently allege that the disparagement of Suboxone tablets took place along-
side ‘coercive’ measures,” as “[t]he threatened removal of the tablets from
the market in conjunction with the alleged fabricated safety concerns could
plausibly coerce patients and doctors to switch from tablet to film.”149  The
court recognized that “Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that various market
forces unique to the pharmaceutical industry make generic substitution the
cost-efficient means of competing for companies selling generic
pharmaceuticals.”150  In particular, the court noted that the “disconnect”
that “exists between the person paying for the prescription and the person
selecting the appropriate treatment” led to “the ordinary market forces that
would allow consumers to consider price when selecting a product [being]
derailed.”151  A patient would not be able to “simply request to receive a
generic from his or her pharmacist because the film and the generic tablets
are not [bioequivalent] and thus may not be substituted.”152  The court
noted but did not rely on the dichotomy between hard and soft switches,
instead conducting an analysis rooted in the regulatory framework and ulti-
mately concluding that the plaintiffs “plausibly pleaded exclusionary
conduct.”153
D. Doryx: Ignored Regulatory Regime
While the Suboxone court grounded its decision in the regulatory frame-
work, the Third Circuit in Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Warner Chilcott (Doryx)154
did not.  In that case, Warner Chilcott engaged in an array of behaviors that
resembled those of Abbott in TriCor: it stopped selling capsule versions of
acne-treating Doryx to wholesalers; removed Doryx capsules from its website;
worked with retailers to “auto-reference” the Doryx tablet whenever a doctor
filed a Doryx prescription; informed wholesalers, retailers, and dealers that
“Doryx Capsules have been replaced by Doryx Tablets;” and bought back and




150 Id. at 683–84.
151 Id. at 684.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 No. 15-2236, 2016 WL 5403626 (3d Cir. Sept. 28, 2016).
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destroyed capsule inventory.155  Despite allegations of hard switches and lack
of economic sense, the court rejected Mylan’s claims of anticompetitive con-
duct, finding that “Mylan was not foreclosed from the market.”156  Even
though it found, “viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mylan, that
Defendants had indeed made the Doryx ‘hops’ primarily to ‘delay generic
market entry,’” it affirmed summary judgment for the Defendants.157
After concluding that the plaintiff—the competitor generic manufac-
turer—failed to adduce evidence of monopoly power,158 the court indicated
that it would have affirmed summary judgment on the alternative ground
that the plaintiff failed to satisfy its initial burden of introducing evidence of
anticompetitive conduct under the Rule of Reason.159  But the court never
explained what it considered to be an anticompetitive effect; nor did it con-
sider whether a substantial reduction in the prescription base available for
automatic generic substitution would count.  Instead, in direct opposition to
the Supreme Court’s instruction that the relevant effect is on consumers, not
competitors,160 the court focused exclusively on the effect of Warner Chil-
cott’s conduct on Mylan, the generic competitor, never even mentioning the
effect on consumers.161
155 Id. at *3.
156 Id. at *10.
157 Id. at *5 (quoting Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott, PLC (Doryx), No. 12-3824,
2015 WL 1736957, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015)).
158 This Article does not address the monopoly-power element of the case.  But just to
mention some of the most glaring of the Doryx court’s fundamental errors on this issue: (1)
the court’s conclusion that Warner Chilcott lacked monopoly power is inconsistent with
the district court’s finding that Warner Chilcott’s “primary” purpose was to “delay generic
market entry,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), as a manufacturer without monop-
oly power typically will not spend money to exclude a rival; (2) the court engaged in a
muddled analysis of direct evidence of market power in the form of price-cost margins and
output reductions; (3) the court acknowledged the existence of the price disconnect, id. at
*2, but ignored its role in generating market power; (4) the court’s crediting of anecdotal
evidence that “some” and a “number” of managed care organizations “sought to” generate
price competition among therapeutic alternatives, id. at *9 (quoting Doryx, 2015 WL
1736957, at *9 (internal quotation marks omitted)), did not address the relevant issue—
the actual effect of these efforts on marketwide prices; (5) the court applied the wrong legal
(and economic) standard for defining relevant antitrust markets, incorrectly holding that
products are in the same market if there is “the existence of cross-elasticity” between them,
id. at *10, when the proper standard is whether sufficient cross-elasticity exists between
them to constrain the price to the competitive level; and (6) relatedly, the court failed to consider
that its analysis succumbed to the Cellophane fallacy in its assumption that lost sales from
price increases revealed a lack of monopoly power instead of a monopolist’s inability to
charge an infinite price.
159 Id.
160 E.g., Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 385 (3d Cir. 2005)
(noting that the Supreme Court in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477
(1977), held that “antitrust laws protect consumers, not competitors”).
161 Doryx, 2016 WL 5403626, at *11.  We focus our analysis on only some of the most
glaring of the court’s fundamental mistakes, not addressing, for example, its mischaracter-
ization of the facts and fundamental holding in Namenda. See id.
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Regarding the product hops’ effects on Mylan (and assuming this were
an appropriate inquiry, which it is not), the court offered only a series of
non-sequiturs, asserting that Warner Chilcott’s conduct was not anticompeti-
tive because:
(1) Mylan received a 180-day exclusivity period under the Hatch-Wax-
man Act162 (although Mylan’s sales at relatively high generic prices are irrele-
vant to whether Warner Chilcott substantially reduced the number of sales
and profits that Mylan would have made absent the product hops);
(2) Mylan set its generic price higher than the brand price for a period
of time163 (although the court failed to explain the relevance of this fact and
did not consider whether the product hop caused Mylan’s pricing strategy—a
generic unable to distribute its product through automatic substitution
might well increase price for the sales it can make);
(3) Mylan made profits of $146.9 million on the sales of generic
Doryx164 (although that number is meaningless unless compared to the prof-
its that Mylan would have made absent the product hops).165
Finally, the Court offered a hodge-podge potpourri for courts to decide
other product-hopping cases, stating that courts should balance exceedingly
broad policy goals, such as “encouraging innovation,” “protect[ing] consum-
ers,” and “ensur[ing] fair competition.”166  Among the “non-exhaustive” fac-
tors that courts may consider is the need to be “wary” of “turning courts into
tribunals over innovation sufficiency.”167  Presumably another factor to con-
sider is the decisions of fifty states and Congress to promote generic competi-
tion.  The court provided no guidance at all on how courts are to balance
these objectives.
E. Namenda: Robust Regulatory Analysis, Improper Coercion Focus
The Second Circuit has offered another recent treatment.  In New York
ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), the court upheld a preliminary
injunction preventing brand firm Forest from withdrawing its original drug
from the market.168  As Forest’s Alzheimer’s drug Namenda IR (taken twice a




165 The court also asserted that Warner Chilcott had “offered strong evidence” of
procompetitive justifications but did not discuss evidence sufficient to defeat summary
judgment such as whether Mylan could rebut those justifications, show that Warner Chil-
cott could have achieved those objectives in a less restrictive manner, or show that the
conduct was anticompetitive on balance.
166 Id. at *12.
167 Id.  While the court noted that Congress could have chosen to expressly make prod-
uct hopping unlawful, id. at *12 n.88, it also could have enacted special antitrust rules for
product hops or made them immune from antitrust scrutiny altogether.  The court also
implied, without citation to any facts, that the price disconnect generates market power
only in the presence of “extreme [doctor] coercion” or other similar factors. Id. at *12.
168 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015).
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once a day), with a patent expiring fourteen years later.169  Although it ini-
tially planned to keep IR on the market (the soft switch), it later imple-
mented a plan to effectively withdraw IR from the market (the hard
switch).170
The court found that “neither product withdrawal nor product improve-
ment alone is anticompetitive,” but “when a monopolist combines product
withdrawal with some other conduct, the overall effect of which is to coerce
consumers rather than persuade them on the merits and to impede competi-
tion, its actions are anticompetitive under the Sherman Act.”171  The court
also rejected a defense based on “free riding” since “generic substitution by
pharmacists following the end of Namenda IR’s exclusivity period [ ] is
authorized by law; is the explicit goal of state substitution laws;” and also
“furthers the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act by promoting drug competition
and by preventing the ‘practical extension of [the brand firm’s] monop-
oly . . . beyond the expiration of the[ ] patent[ ].’”172
The court held that the defendants’ justifications were pretextual, and
that even if they were not, any benefits were “outweighed by the anticompeti-
tive harms.”173  It found monopolization from the combination of “withdraw-
ing a successful drug from the market” and “introducing a reformulated
version of that drug,” which forced patients to “switch to the new version”
and “imped[ed] generic competition, without a legitimate business justifica-
tion.”174  The court then upheld an injunction because of the irreparable
harm from the “planned hard switch strategy.”175  The court required the
defendants to continue making Namenda IR tablets available.176
While the court understood the regulatory framework, it applied a test
based on coercion that was underinclusive in targeting antitrust harm.  The
court stated that
[a]s long as Defendants sought to persuade patients and their doctors to
switch from Namenda IR to Namenda XR while both were on the market
(the soft switch) and with generic IR drugs on the horizon, patients and
doctors could evaluate the products and their generics on the merits in fur-
therance of competitive objectives.177
The court focused on Forest’s “forc[ing] patients to switch” from
Namenda IR to Namenda XR, and cited the defendants’ figures that a soft
169 Id. at 642.
170 Id. at 658.
171 Id. at 653–54 (citations omitted).
172 Id. at 657–58 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (citing FTC v.
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013)) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4
(1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2688).
173 Id. at 658.
174 Id. at 659.
175 Id. at 660–61 (quoting New York v. Actavis, PLC, No. 14-Civ.-7473, 2014 WL 7015198
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2014)).
176 Id. at 649.
177 Id. at 654.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-1\NDL104.txt unknown Seq: 34 30-NOV-16 8:35
200 notre dame law review [vol. 92:1
switch would convert only 30% of patients while a hard switch would convert
80 to 100%.178  The court stated that “[h]ad Defendants allowed Namenda
IR to remain available until generic entry, doctors and Alzheimer’s patients
could have decided whether the benefits of switching to once-daily Namenda
XR would outweigh the benefits of adhering to twice-daily therapy using less-
expensive generic IR (or perhaps lower-priced Namenda IR),” but “[b]y
removing Namenda IR from the market prior to generic IR entry, Defend-
ants sought to deprive consumers of that choice.”179
While the court appreciated the regulatory regime, its coercion-based
framework does not make room for potential soft-switch harms that arise
from the unique nature of drug markets and that might not make economic
sense.
F. Commentators: Abandonment of Antitrust Analysis
Though many of the courts could have benefited from further attention
to the price-disconnect market failure, at least (with the exception of Wal-
greens and Doryx) they anticipated a nontrivial role for antitrust law.  That is
more than can be said for commentators Joshua D. Wright, a former Federal
Trade Commissioner, and Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg, a Senior Judge on the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in their joint comment to the
Canadian Competition Bureau on its draft updated Intellectual Property
Enforcement Guidelines.180  In that comment, the authors offer a con-
stricted approach to product hopping that would limit antitrust more than
any of the judicial approaches described above.
Wright and Ginsburg “recommend against imposing a competition law
sanction on product switching absent clear and convincing objective evi-
dence that [the reformulated product] represents a sham innovation with
zero or negative consumer welfare benefits.”181  The authors worry that
“applying a standard competition law analysis is likely to deter innovation
that would have benefitted consumers.”182  The given reason is that “innova-
178 Id.
179 Id. at 655.
180 Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Comment on the Canadian Competition
Bureau’s Draft Updated Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines (Aug. 10, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/734661/
150810canadacomment.pdf.  The Guidelines concluded that product switching could con-
stitute an abuse of a dominant position based on factors such as the likely effect of a
brand’s conduct on a generic’s ability to compete and whether the brand’s purpose was “to
delay or foreclose” generic supply. COMPETITION BUREAU CAN., ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Ex. 9A, at 37–39 (2016).  To the extent it is relevant, Carrier
served as a consultant to the Bureau on the Guidelines.
181 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 180, at 1.
182 Id. at 2.  For a similar argument, see Dennis W. Carlton et al., A Critical Evaluation
of the FTC’s Theory of Product Hopping as a Way to Promote Competition 13–15 (July 8,
2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=28
08822.
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tions, including even small changes in product design, can generate signifi-
cant consumer benefits.”183
The authors claim that “[c]ompetition law is not a suitable instrument
for micromanaging product design and innovation” as it “requires competi-
tion agencies and courts to weigh the benefits to consumers from the innova-
tion against any costs to consumers arising from the diminution of
competition.”184  The agencies and courts are “ill-equipped” to make these
determinations, and it is “unclear” whether such a balancing “can be done at
all.”185
The authors also contend that “product switching does not amount to
exclusionary conduct because the generic company is still free to compete
and is ‘able to reach consumers through, inter alia, advertising, promotion,
cost competition, or superior product development.’”186
The authors trust not the antitrust agencies but the “judgment [of] the
value of product design changes levied by consumers in the market.”187  The
apparent problem of applying antitrust law is that agencies and courts would
be “substituting their judgment for the judgment made by consumers.”188
The authors claim that subjecting drug reformulations to antitrust scrutiny
“most remarkably assumes that pharmaceutical markets are somehow so dif-
ferent from other product markets that producers are free to ignore con-
sumer judgments about the value of product innovations.”189
At least four problems undermine the authors’ argument.  First, no
empirical or other evidence suggests that a well-structured antitrust analysis
would deter innovation in this setting.  Quite the contrary.  A proper anti-
trust framework could subject to scrutiny only those reformulations that are
temporally linked to the imminent introduction of the generic.  Clear, bright
lines could signal to brand companies that their reformulations would not be
subject to any antitrust scrutiny unless they engage in certain suspect behav-
ior.  In essence, brand firms would “volunteer” for antitrust scrutiny by
engaging in the identified conduct.  The sole empirical analysis on this sub-
ject indicates that just 20% of reformulated drugs are temporally linked to
the imminent introduction of the generic.190  And the five cases litigated to
date represent no more than 1% of all reformulations in the past twenty
years.191
183 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 180, at 2.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 3 (quoting Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott, PLC (Doryx), No. 12-3824,
2015 WL 1736957, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015)); see also Carlton et al., supra note 182, at
8–9.
187 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 180, at 3.
188 Id. at 4.
189 Id.
190 Shadowen et al., supra note 1, at 26–27 (finding that 344 of 425 reformulations
occurred outside the Generic Window).
191 Id.
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The evidence makes clear that, for the subset of potentially anticompeti-
tive reformulations, antitrust scrutiny is likely not to deter innovation, but to
spur it.  Brand firms often withhold incremental innovations from the market to
use them later as part of a product hop.192  For example, manufacturers in
the TriCor case delayed seeking a new indication for the original product,
reserving it exclusively for the reformulated product, even though “[t]he
data necessary to get the new indication was available much earlier.”193  Simi-
larly, in Warner-Lambert’s admission of criminal liability for promoting off-
label uses of seizure-treating Neurontin, it conceded that a “principal rea-
son[ ] for not seeking FDA approval for those uses was that it wanted to
reserve them for a later promotional campaign for its reformulated prod-
uct.”194  And in Namenda, Forest waited until generic competition for twice-
daily Namenda was imminent before introducing the once-daily version, even
though “[a]ll other Alzheimer’s disease treatments are administered once a
day.”195  It is telling that Forest had obtained FDA approval to market the
once-daily version three years earlier but had withheld it from the market
until entry of the twice-daily generics was looming.196
More broadly, in Namenda the court found that the defendants
“presented no evidence to support their argument that antitrust scrutiny of
the pharmaceutical industry will meaningfully deter innovation.”197  The Sec-
ond Circuit noted that “immunizing product hopping from antitrust scrutiny
may deter significant innovation by encouraging manufacturers to focus on
switching the market to trivial or minor product reformulations rather than
investing in the research and development necessary to develop riskier, but
medically significant innovations.”198  Any serious argument that antitrust
scrutiny might deter innovation must contend with the substantial indica-
tions that the absence of scrutiny tempts brands to withhold innovations from
the market and invest in trivial modifications.  In short, industry realities
undercut contrary, evidence-free pronouncements about adverse effects on
innovation.199
192 MARIBEL RIOS, THE OUTSOURCING ADVANTAGES IN FORMULATION DEVELOPMENT 40
(2005) (brands often “intentionally hold[ ] back a twice- or once-a-day formulation to use
against generic competition later on”).
193 Shadowen et al., supra note 105, at 710.
194 Id.
195 New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787 F.3d 638, 647 (2d Cir.
2015).
196 Id.
197 Id. at 659.
198 Id.; see also C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug
Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 615 (2011) (“Brand-name firms have sought
increasing recourse to ancillary patents on chemical variants, alternative formulations,
methods of use, and relatively minor aspects of the drug.”).
199 Nor is it true, as Wright and Ginsburg assert, that an antitrust analysis would require
agencies and courts to weigh the benefits and detriments to consumers.  Wright & Gins-
burg, supra note 180, at 2.  As we develop in detail below, agencies and courts can and
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Second, after assuming that antitrust scrutiny would harm innovation,
Wright and Ginsburg double down by positing, without support, that these
asserted effects outweigh product hopping’s well-established negative price
effects.  On a blockbuster drug, a product hop can deprive consumers of $1
billion or more in cost savings, with little, no, or negative gain in product
quality.200  Wright and Ginsburg offer no empirical or even theoretical basis
for believing that in this industry, where the gains from price competition are
so enormous, any supposed positive innovation effects would outweigh the
documented negative price effects.201  Indeed, the fact that brands withhold
innovations from the market to impair generic competition speaks volumes.
Such delayed reformulations provide strong evidence that losses to consum-
ers from impaired generic competition are greater than any gains from
increased quality.202
Third, Wright and Ginsburg’s assertion that, notwithstanding the prod-
uct hop, generic firms are still able to reach “consumers”203 is curious.  As
the TriCor and Suboxone courts explained, the law (and economics) is clear
that conduct can harm consumers—that it can be condemned as exclusion-
ary—if it substantially impairs competition while not preventing it alto-
gether.204  Wright and Ginsburg suggest that generics, like brands, can
market their products through detailing and product innovation.205  But
again, this ignores the industry’s regulatory structure and competitive dynam-
ics.  Typically, once the brand’s patents are no longer effective, no one—
neither the brand nor any generics—can profitably market the product on a
basis other than price.206
should apply a no-economic-sense test that judges product reformulations based on objec-
tive economic evidence of their value to the manufacturer.
200 On a brand drug with $1 billion in annual sales, the lost savings from impairing
generic competition can easily be $765 million annually: generics take 90% of the unit
sales, at an average price discount (with multiple generics in the market) of at least 85%.
See, e.g., John LaMattina, Patent Expirations of Crestor and Zetia and the Impact on Other Choles-
terol Drugs, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2016/01/
18/patent-expirations-of-crestor-and-zetia-and-the-impact-on-other-cholesterol-drugs/#2b7
08f805c59.
201 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 180.
202 If the value of the “innovation” to consumers were greater than the value to the
manufacturer of impairing generic competition, the manufacturer would immediately
introduce the innovation in order to reap the increased gains. See, e.g., Natalie Mizik &
Robert Jacobson, Trading Off Between Value Creation and Value Appropriation: The Financial
Implications of Shifts in Strategic Emphasis, 67 J. MARKETING 63, 65 (2003).
203 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 180, at 3.
204 See In re Suboxone, 64 F. Supp. 3d 665 (E.D. Pa. 2014); Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc. (TriCor), 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 416–18 (D. Del. 2006); see also Teva Pharm. USA,
Inc. v. Abbott Labs. (TriCor II), 580 F. Supp. 2d 345 (D. Del. 2008).
205 See also Carlton et al., supra note 182, at 8–9.
206 This is why, when facing imminent generic competition, brands almost always stop
promoting the product.  Shadowen et al., supra note 1, at 15.  To the extent Wright and
Ginsburg suggest that generics are free to market their products based on price, they fail to
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In this setting, costs incurred to encourage a doctor to write a prescrip-
tion for one’s product would be squandered because the pharmacist could
fill the prescription with a competitor’s AB-rated product.207  As Namenda
concluded, “additional expenditures by generics on marketing would be
impractical and ineffective because a generic manufacturer promoting a
product would have no way to ensure that a pharmacist would substitute its
product, rather than one made by one of its generic competitors.”208
The inability of generics to profitably market to doctors is desirable.  If a
generic could do so, this would reintroduce the price-disconnect failure.
The generic-substitution regime is designed to render unprofitable active mar-
keting of the product to doctors.  Yet Wright and Ginsburg suggest that
generics try to defeat product hops by engaging in the doctor-focused mar-
keting that is the problem and that DPS laws intentionally render
unprofitable.
Fourth, Wright and Ginsburg find it “remarkabl[e]” that scholars and
courts conclude that the price disconnect substantially impairs these mar-
kets.209  This is the crux of their analysis.  Yet they provide neither empirical
nor theoretical support for second-guessing the judgment of Congress in
1963 and 1984, the repeated conclusions of the FTC, and the unanimous
judgment of all fifty states.  The price disconnect is the economic premise
around which all states and the federal government have for the past forty
years built a robust generic-substitution regulatory regime.210  And it is the
bedrock principle around which respected industry scholars have based their
work.211  Yet Wright and Ginsburg try to wave it away based on their say-so
and nothing else.
Having denied the existence of the price disconnect, Wright and Gins-
burg do not address the question whether, given its existence and impor-
tance in these markets, the disconnect (as opposed to valued innovations) is
a likely source of market power and sound basis for antitrust scrutiny.  It is
address the viability and strength of that competition in the face of substitutability at the
pharmacy counter.  Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 180, at 2.
207 Shadowen et al., supra note 1, at 15.
208 New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787 F.3d 638, 656 (2d Cir.
2015).
209 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 180, at 4.
210 See also Namenda, 787 F.3d at 657–58 (recognizing that “what Defendants call ‘free
riding’ . . . is authorized by law; is the explicit goal of state substitution laws; and furthers
the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act by promoting drug competition and by preventing the
‘practical extension of [brand drug manufacturers’] monopoly . . . beyond the expiration
of the[ir] patent[s]” (second, third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (citations
omitted) (citing FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013)) (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2688)); see also Actavis, 133
S. Ct. at 2228 (recognizing the Hatch-Waxman Act’s bestowal on generics of the ability to
“piggy-back” on brands’ approval efforts, which speed “‘the introduction of low-cost
generic drugs to market’ . . . thereby furthering drug competition” (quoting Caraco
Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012))).
211 See Shadowen et al., supra note 1, at 10 n.32 (collecting sources).
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well-established that lesser market failures, such as strong network effects, are
a basis for scrutiny.212  Generic products are substitutable only if they are AB-
rated to the brand, and, just as in network industries, this requirement of
“compatibility” with the brand increases the opportunity and incentive for
competition-impairing reformulations.213  This premium on compatibility
(as well as attention to the regulatory regime) fully justifies antitrust scrutiny
in drug markets.214
In short, limiting antitrust scrutiny of product hopping to “sham innova-
tions” is a recipe for anticompetitive behavior in complex markets that would
have dramatic effects on consumers.215
IV. A NEW PRODUCT-HOPPING FRAMEWORK
As should be crystal clear, the pharmaceutical industry is unique in its
complexity.  Any antitrust analysis of product-hopping conduct must there-
fore, as the Supreme Court has explained, “be attuned to the particular struc-
ture and circumstances of the industry at issue.”216  With courts veering from
simplistic “choice,” to underinclusive coercion, to varied attention to the reg-
ulatory regime, it is time for a new antitrust framework for product hopping.
This Part embarks on such a project.
Section A begins by offering two safe harbors for brand firms based on
the timing of the reformulation.  The first applies when the brand introduces
a reformulation outside the temporal window in which generic entry is
expected.  The second applies when the brand introduces the reformulation
after the generic version of the original product has entered the market.  Sec-
tion B then introduces a no-economic-sense test that has been applied else-
where in antitrust law, which offers greater certainty for brand firms, and
which results in a finding of monopolization when the brand engages in con-
duct that makes sense only by stifling generic competition.
212 See IIIB PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 776c, at 297
(3d ed. 2008) (explaining that network effects justify antitrust scrutiny of Microsoft’s prod-
uct redesigns); see also John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy,
39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 681 (2012) (arguing for antitrust scrutiny of computer code
redesigns).
213 Shadowen et al., supra note 1, at 79–81.
214 See, e.g., HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 125, § 15.3 (pharmaceutical reformulations
should be subjected to the same antitrust analysis as product redesigns in network indus-
tries); Jonathan Jacobson et al., Predatory Innovation: An Analysis of Allied Orthopedic v.
Tyco in the Context of Section 2 Jurisprudence, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 8 (2010) (“There
are two scenarios where an exclusionary redesign may be especially harmful: (a) in the
context of networked markets . . .; and (b) in pharmaceutical markets . . . .”).
215 Like Wright and Ginsburg, Richard Gilbert worries about the effect on innovation
of subjecting product-hopping to antitrust scrutiny.  Gilbert, supra note 62, at 71.  His anal-
ysis also implies that withholding a true innovation from the market reduces consumer
welfare. Id. at 52.  But he never puts the two concepts together by realizing that the failure
to subject product hopping to antitrust scrutiny will impair innovation.
216 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411
(2004).
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This Part focuses on the safe harbors and no-economic-sense test.  But
many reformulations will not even reach these stages.  Our definition of
product hopping requires:
(1) reformulating the product in a way that makes a generic version of
the original product not substitutable; and
(2) encouraging doctors to write prescriptions for the reformulated
product rather than the original product, i.e., switching the prescription base
from the original to the reformulated product.
The second factor in particular distinguishes between the brand’s
expansion of the prescription base by taking away sales from other branded
products or enticing new patients into the market, and switching the base
solely to impair generic competition.  The former, which will be satisfied by
the mere introduction of a product (even one predicted to lose money) or
the equal promotion of the old and reformulated products, will not raise
antitrust concern.  The other could, however, depending on the application
of the safe harbors and no-economic-sense test.
The switching of the prescription base is particularly concerning in the
pharmaceutical industry because of the price disconnect, as the doctor who
prescribes the product does not pay, and the consumer (or her insurer) who
pays does not choose.  With no one making the fundamental judgment as to
whether the “innovation” is worth the price, the brand manufacturer has an
incentive and opportunity to make product redesigns with welfare-reducing
intent and effect.  The market cannot prevent the brand from switching the
prescription base to a product that is not in fact worth the consumer savings
that are lost from the impaired generic competition.
A. Safe Harbors
Brand firms often introduce new versions of existing drugs.  The vast
majority of these reformulations do not threaten competitive harm.  For
example, brands often, without reducing their promotion of the original ver-
sion, introduce modestly-adjusted versions of their products to fill out a prod-
uct line or satisfy demand for a particular formulation or delivery
mechanism.  We offer two safe harbors to ensure that antitrust liability is off
the table for changes like these.
The first safe harbor immunizes reformulations made long enough
before generic approval that they typically are not intended to impair generic
competition.  The second safe harbor exempts reformulations that are not
likely to thwart generic competition because they are introduced after the
generic version of the original drug has entered the market.  The safe
harbors ensure that brands have the certainty to engage in most of their
anticipated reformulations without facing potential antitrust liability.  And
they offer a more deferential analysis than currently exists in the caselaw.
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1. Outside Generic Window
The first safe harbor applies when a brand introduces a reformulated
drug outside a “Generic Window” in which generic entry is expected.  We
propose immunity for the introduction of reformulations outside a four-year
window, as these reformulations are less likely to have the purpose and effect
of impairing generic competition.
Such a window would begin 18 months before the first generic applica-
tion (Abbreviated New Drug Application or ANDA) is filed seeking approval
to market a generic version of the original brand product.  The rationale for
granting a safe harbor for reformulations made prior to the 18-month period
immediately before the ANDA filing is straightforward.  Eighteen months is
sufficient time for the generic firm to reformulate the generic product to
match the new brand product and file an ANDA on the reformulated ver-
sion.  Thus, a reformulation implemented earlier than 18 months before the
first ANDA is filed is unlikely to alter the competitive landscape.  In such a
case, no ANDA is about to be filed, and the reformulation is not temporally
linked to generic entry.217
The rationale for denying a safe harbor once the ANDA is filed is also
straightforward: the brand can get an automatic 30-month stay on approval
of the generic.218  The brand should not enjoy antitrust immunity for refor-
mulations made while the generic is statutorily prohibited from entering the
market.  Reformulations made while the generic is prohibited from entering
are likely to be aimed at delaying generic competition.  The combination of
the 18- and 30-month periods results in a four-year window.  Outside this
window, a brand’s reformulation should be immune from antitrust scrutiny.
Two examples clarify.  Assume that the brand reformulates from a cap-
sule to a tablet and begins switching the market in October 2009—three
months before the first ANDA is filed in January 2010 (see Figure 1).  Assume
further that the ANDA contains a Paragraph IV certification that the brand’s
capsule patent is invalid—a certification that elicits a patent lawsuit by the
brand and an automatic 30-month stay, prohibiting generic entry until July
2012.  A strong possibility in this case is that (1) the brand had anticipated
the filing of the ANDA and timed the reformulation to impair the antici-
pated competition; (2) the generic’s planning was so far advanced that it
made sense to file the ANDA despite the reformulation; and (3) the reformu-
lation could delay generic competition by prompting the generic firm to
reformulate its product to match the new brand tablet, a process that could
take, say, 15 months.  In January 2011, the generic files a new ANDA, with a
new Paragraph IV certification for the tablet product.  The brand sues again,
which results in an automatic stay that expires in July 2013—a one-year delay
217 The event that triggers the safe harbor is the brand’s introduction on the market of
the reformulated version.  The event is not FDA approval of the reformulation because the
brand could still, after approval, delay entering the market, even for years, to forestall
generic entry.
218 Carrier, supra note 2, at 1018.
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from July 2012, when the 30-month stay on the capsule product expired.  This
reformulation would not enjoy a safe harbor under our framework because
the reformulation occurred within 18 months of the filing of the first ANDA.
FIGURE 1
30-month stay



















Now consider the same reformulation from a capsule to a tablet, but
assume that the brand begins switching the market in January 2008—24
months before the first ANDA is filed in January 2010 (see Figure 2).  This
switch is not likely to alter the competitive terrain because the generic manu-
facturer has ample time to reformulate from a capsule to a tablet and get the
ANDA and Paragraph IV certification for the tablet on file by January 2010.
Because the generic has the time to file an ANDA directly on the brand’s
reformulated tablet, no delay beyond the original 30-month stay results from
the reformulation.  Under our framework, this reformulation enjoys a safe
harbor because the reformulation occurred more than 18 months before the
filing of the first ANDA.219
219 We offer a slightly different rule when the brand product enjoys five-year NCE
exclusivity. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012).  In that setting, we would provide a safe
harbor only for a reformulation that begins 30 months or less after the start of the NCE
exclusivity period.  The FDA is precluded from accepting for filing any ANDA for such a
product until four years after the start of the NCE exclusivity period.  To ensure that the
generic manufacturer has 18 months to react to any reformulation and still be in as good a
competitive posture as it would have been absent the reformulation, we would subject to
antitrust scrutiny any reformulation that begins 30 months (18 months plus 12 months
(representing the one-year period within the five-year exclusivity in which the generic can
file an ANDA)) or less before the end of the five-year period.
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FIGURE 2
30-month stay











In short, a reformulation that occurs within 18 months of the filing of
the first ANDA often appears to have the purpose and effect of impairing
generic competition.  In contrast, a reformulation made more than 18
months before the first ANDA is filed likely had neither that purpose nor
that effect.  Historically, the vast majority of product reformulations have
fallen outside this Generic Window and thus would enjoy the antitrust safe
harbor under our proposal.220  Procedurally, antitrust agencies could simply
announce and apply this safe harbor.  Private litigation is unlikely to ensue if
the brand introduced the reformulated product outside the Generic Window
because the reformulation typically will not have caused any damage.  If any
private litigation does ensue, the brand could point to the reformulation’s
timing and ask the court to give dispositive (or near-dispositive) weight to it
in the no-economic-sense analysis we advocate below.
2. Reformulation After Generic Entry
One characteristic of the safe harbor for reformulations outside the
Generic Window is that obtaining immunity is not within the brand’s direct
control.  The safe harbor is tied to the filing of the ANDA, an event that the
generic, not the brand, controls.
In contrast, the second safe harbor is entirely within the brand firm’s
control.  We propose immunity for a reformulation introduced after a
generic version of the original product has entered the market.221  As noted
in detail above, reformulations introduced after generic entry are far less
effective in impairing generic competition.  Generics make three to ten times
more sales if the reformulation is introduced after (compared to before)
generic entry.222
To be sure, quality competition between the reformulated brand and
generic original products may not be ideal.  The brand firm may have with-
drawn all of its promotion and marketing from the original product.  Or it
may have switched all of its promotion and marketing to the reformulated
product.  But at least doctors, third-party payors, and consumers are gener-
220 Shadowen et al., supra note 1, at 2, 26.
221 Even the introduction of the generic contemporaneously with the brand results in sig-
nificant sales to the generic. See, e.g., Ernst R. Berndt et al., Authorized Generic Drugs, Price
Competition, and Consumers’ Welfare, 26 HEALTH AFF. 790, 797 (2007).
222 See generally Haiden A. Huskamp et al., Generic Entry, Reformulations, and Promotion of
SSRIs, 26 PHARMACOECONOMICS 603, 604 (2008).
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ally aware that a generic is on the market and the industry’s generic-promot-
ing mechanisms have a chance to work.223  And because reformulations after
generic entry have such a significantly reduced effect on generic competi-
tion, we offer a safe harbor, freeing the brand firm even from the task of
showing that its conduct makes economic sense.224
On balance, we believe the antitrust agencies and courts should recog-
nize this safe harbor to ensure that the brand has the ability, within its sole
control, to completely avoid antitrust scrutiny.  This guarantees that consum-
ers will get the benefit of any innovations whose true purpose is to offer an
improved product, not to impair generic competition.
B. No-Economic-Sense Test
The safe harbors introduced in the previous section provide far more
protection for brands than is offered under the caselaw.  In contrast, the no-
economic-sense test we introduce in this section reaches more aggressively
than some of the caselaw—specifically, Walgreens and Doryx—to deter
anticompetitive conduct.  The fact that a test so universally viewed as defen-
dant-friendly leads to such different results shows how far those two cases
223 Devlin and Jacobs come to a similar result, but on erroneous grounds. See Alan
Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Anticompetitive Innovation and the Quality of Invention, 27 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1 (2012).  As we understand it, they would subject to antitrust scrutiny only those
product hops in which the reformulated version enters before the generic of the original
product has received FDA approval. Id. at 49.  They would do so, however, based on the
incorrect assertion that the FDA is prohibited from approving an ANDA if the brand firm
has removed its product from the market. Id.
More fundamentally, Devlin and Jacobs wrongly assert that a product hop that does
not prohibit a generic from gaining FDA approval “cannot exclude an equally or more
efficient rival, [and therefore] fails to arouse the concern at the heart of Section Two
jurisprudence.” Id. at 50.  Like Wright and Ginsburg, they fail to address, let alone satisfac-
torily include in their analysis, the price disconnect, which does substantially impair compe-
tition from equally efficient rivals.  Also erroneous is their assertion that courts should not
apply antitrust principles to drug markets because “antitrust rules are designed to operate
in unregulated markets . . . .” Id. at 51.  To the contrary, courts are required to apply
antitrust principles to regulated markets and to take into account unique characteristics
such as the price disconnect. See also FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234, 2235
(2013) (noting the “general procompetitive thrust” of the Hatch-Waxman Act and holding
that courts must apply antitrust law to prevent brands from manipulating the “unique regu-
latory framework” that “unintentionally . . . created special incentives” for anticompetitive
conduct).
224 Carlton gives an example of a product hop in which the brand stops promoting the
original product two years after introducing the reformulated product.  Carlton et al., supra
note 182, at 7.  That example would almost certainly fall within one of our safe harbors
and/or would pass the no-economic-sense test.  Brand manufacturers engaged in a prod-
uct hop designed to impair generic entry make the switch before the generics enter, and
they achieve the switch by stopping promotion of the original product in favor of the refor-
mulated product.  So if a brand manufacturer has continued promoting the original prod-
uct for two years after introducing the reformulated product, as in the Carlton example, it
is doing something other than trying to impair generic competition.
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veered from justified economic analysis.  And while the no-economic-sense
test leads to the same result in TriCor, Suboxone, and Namenda, the test keeps
the antitrust analysis focused on economic realities rather than any artificial
distinctions between “hard” and “soft” switches.
The no-economic-sense analysis asks whether conduct allegedly main-
taining a monopoly by excluding nascent competition “likely would have
been profitable if the nascent competition flourished and the monopoly was
not maintained.”225  Applying the test requires a comparison of the con-
duct’s gains (not including those from eliminating competition) and costs to
the monopolist.226  Conduct yielding a net negative payoff to the monopolist
fails the test.227  The test focuses on the conduct’s “reasonably anticipated
impact” (according to “objective economic considerations for a reasonable
person”) when undertaken rather than its actual impact.228
The no-economic-sense inquiry offers an economic test to determine
whether the monopolist’s sole motive was to impair competition.  If a firm
undertakes conduct that makes no economic sense, then its “anticompetitive
intent” can be “unambiguously . . . inferred.”229  As one commentator has
explained, the test’s application “could not be simpler if . . . the conduct
cannot possibly confer an economic benefit on the defendant other than by
eliminating competition.”230  Even the “technological superiority” of a new
product should not prevent a finding of exclusionary conduct since the
“value to consumers of the new system relative to the preexisting system” may
not be “greater than the required development costs.”231  In short, if a brand
225 Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The “No Economic
Sense” Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 415 (2006).  For conduct allegedly creating a monopoly,
the test asks “whether the conduct likely would have been profitable if the existing compet-
itors were not excluded and monopoly was not created.” Id.
226 Id. at 416.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary Conduct—Are
There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 393 (2006); see also id. at 391–92 (employ-
ing the “sacrifice test” because it is “widely used,” but recognizing that both this test and
the no-economic-sense test depend “not on the timeline, but rather on the nature of the
conduct—on whether it would make no business or economic sense but for its likelihood
of harming competition”); Shadowen et al., supra note 1, at 76 (explaining that conduct
that is economically irrational absent reduced competition leads to the natural inference
that the actor “was aware of and motivated solely to achieve that reduction”).
230 Werden, supra note 225, at 415.
231 Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and
Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8, 49 (1981); see also Spirit Airlines v. Nw. Airlines, 431 F.3d
917, 953 (6th Cir. 2005) (Moore, J., concurring) (involving predation claims based on the
theory that “an incumbent seeks to retain monopolist control in the future by ceasing to
engage in economically rational behavior in the present in an effort to drive potential
rivals from the market”); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF 144 (1978) (laying out a test used to identify business practices that “would not
be considered profit maximizing except for the expectation either that (1) rivals will be
driven from the market, leaving the predator with a market share sufficient to command
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acquires or maintains monopoly power by engaging in product hopping that
fails the no-economic-sense test, courts should find it liable for illegal monop-
olization since the behavior makes no sense other than by stifling generic
competition.
Our use of the no-economic-sense test avoids some of the recognized
shortcomings of the profit-sacrifice test.232  In particular, the profit-sacrifice
test could punish short-term sacrifices such as investments in R&D or capital
equipment even though they would lead to a higher profit in the long
term.233  The no-economic-sense test does not punish such investments
“because they make economic sense apart from any tendency to eliminate
competition and because they have no such tendency.”234  The test also
avoids disputes about whether the manufacturer anticipated that it would
recoup its sacrificed profits sometime in the future.235  Some anticompetitive
product hops could be profitable to the brand immediately, with no lost prof-
its to be recouped later.
1. Virtues of the No-Economic-Sense Test
From the brand firm’s perspective, the no-economic-sense test has three
advantages as compared to existing caselaw.  First, the test judges conduct ex
ante rather than ex post.  That is, the relevant inquiry under the no-economic-
sense test is whether at the time of the reformulation the firm projected that the
additional profits would justify the additional costs.  The no-economic-sense
test does not impose liability when the brand projects that the profits would
exceed the costs but miscalculates because the costs were greater or the sales
lower than reasonably projected.  This is a significant advantage as the brand
monopoly profits, or (2) rivals will be chastened sufficiently to abandon competitive behav-
ior the predator finds inconvenient or threatening”).
232 The profit-sacrifice analysis determines if conduct would be “unprofitable for the
defendant but for the exclusion of rivals and resulting supra-competitive recoupment.”
Melamed, supra note 229, at 389; see also Ordover & Willig, supra note 231, at 9–10
(“[P]redatory behavior is a response to a rival that sacrifices part of the profit that could be
earned under competitive circumstances, were the rival to remain viable, in order to
induce exit and gain consequent additional monopoly profit.” (footnotes omitted)).
233 Werden, supra note 225, at 424; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Harvard and Chi-
cago Schools and the Dominant Firm 14 (Univ. Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-19,
2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1014153 (noting that the
profit-sacrifice test “does not adequately distinguish anticompetitive ‘sacrifice’ from
procompetitive ‘investment’”).
234 Werden, supra note 225, at 424.
235 See Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695,
1699 (2013) (describing “unnecessary and counterproductive” recoupment analysis);
Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Stan-
dard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 319–20 (2006) (noting that the no-economic-sense test “is
primarily different from the conventional profit-sacrifice standard because it does not
require a showing that there is a period of time in which the defendant’s profits are lower
than they were before the exclusionary conduct was undertaken” and “[t]he reduction in
profits can be conceptual rather than temporal”).
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can be fairly certain whether a given reformulation will avoid antitrust
liability.
Second, and relatedly, the no-economic-sense test is based on objective
economic evidence rather than ambiguous qualitative evidence of “intent.”
Emails, narratives in memoranda, and the like may provide some surround-
ing “flavor” as to whether a reformulation makes economic sense.  But the
foundation of the no-economic-sense test consists of the manufacturer’s sales
and costs projections: Did the brand project that its reformulation of the
product and cannibalization of the prescription base would expand sales suf-
ficiently to justify the additional costs?  Such an inquiry promotes certainty in
business planning.
Third, the no-economic-sense test offers an easier antitrust hurdle for
the brand to clear, substantively, than the rule-of-reason standard, which con-
siders anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifications.  As noted
above, the no-economic-sense test is essentially an economic test to deter-
mine whether the brand’s sole motive was to impair competition.  The brand
will clear the no-economic-sense hurdle with a mixed motive of impairing
competition and offering an improved product, even if the former motive
swamps the latter.
This can be seen with an example that applies both the no-economic-
sense test and the Rule of Reason.  Assume that a product hop (1) will cost
$20 million in additional R&D; (2) will be valued by a small group of new
purchasers (enticed away from other therapeutic alternatives), resulting in
additional sales of $40 million; and (3) will impair generic competition at a
cost to existing purchasers of $160 million.  Under the Rule of Reason, this
reformulation would likely be unlawful because the costs to purchasers far out-
weigh the benefits to purchasers.  But under the no-economic-sense test, the
reformulation would likely be lawful because the costs to the manufacturer are
less than the benefits to the manufacturer.
Courts and agencies apply a no-economic-sense test when the type of
conduct in which the manufacturer is engaged—here, designing products
and bringing them to market—is generally the type of conduct that benefits
consumers.  So even if the conduct might not be welfare-enhancing when
analyzed on a product-by-product basis, it may well be welfare-enhancing
when viewed through a wider lens.  Legal rules attempt to avoid deterring the
type of conduct that generally results in welfare gains unless the evidence
makes clear that the particular instance of the conduct is anticompetitive and
should not be countenanced.  In short, the no-economic-sense test imposes
liability only when, ex ante, objective evidence shows that the brand’s sole
motive was to impair competition.236
236 Gilbert contends that a rule targeting “predatory innovation” could falsely condemn
“[r]eally good” innovations that are costly to develop but that in the long run may “make
old technologies obsolete.”  Gilbert, supra note 62, at 52.  Under the test we propose, a
manufacturer that projected that its design change would revolutionize the therapeutic
class and thus take sales from other branded drugs in the class would easily clear our no-
economic-sense threshold.  In contrast, the design changes that would not pass are those
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2. Support for the No-Economic-Sense Test
Many courts, most notably the Supreme Court, have endorsed and
applied the no-economic-sense test.237  In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp., the Court found that the defendant “was willing to sacrifice
short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-
run impact on its smaller rival.”238  And in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, the Court confirmed that the evidence in Aspen
Skiing reflected “a willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an
anticompetitive end.”239  Lower courts have offered similar approaches.240
that the manufacturer projects will not take sales from other branded products in the class
and thus whose only motivation is to impair competition from imminent generic competi-
tion.  Gilbert worries about falsely condemning a breakthrough innovation that involves “a
sacrifice of profit in the short run followed by elimination of rivals and higher prices (or
lower consumer surplus) . . . .” Id. at 53.  Our test accurately condemns only those design
changes that make no economic sense and result in eliminating only the generic competitor.
 Gilbert also goes awry in his treatment of the role of regulation in the antitrust analy-
sis.  He asserts that if the regulatory structure of the pharmaceutical industry generates
competition concerns unique to the industry, the remedy is to change the regulations. Id.
at 74; see also Carlton et al., supra note 182, at 11–13.  We believe, and the courts have
consistently held, that antitrust enforcers and courts must take the existing regulatory structure
as a given.  That means that courts must apply antitrust law unless the regulatory structure
displaces it (and it is clear that in the pharmaceutical industry it does not).  Verizon
Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004).  Courts
cannot get into the business of deciding whether competition from generic drugs—espe-
cially competition that is encouraged by comprehensive federal and state law—is bad for
consumers.  Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978); see also
generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 67, at 709, 717 (noting that “[t]he pharmaceutical
industry presents a perfect storm for regulatory gaming” and that “[i]f a pharmaceutical
company designs its products for the sole purpose of dragging out a regulatory process for
years and thereby forestalling competition, it has engaged in exclusionary behavior that
harms consumers”).
237 Many of the courts’ versions apply the related profit-sacrifice test, which offers an
even more aggressive test that may not credit short-term profit sacrifice even for long-term
economic gain. See supra notes 232–33 and accompanying text.
238 472 U.S. 585, 610–11 (1985).
239 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004).
240 See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1075 (10th Cir. 2013) (stat-
ing that the test is satisfied when a “monopolist’s conduct [is] irrational but for its anticom-
petitive effect” (citing Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407; Aspen, 472 U.S. at 597; IIIB AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 212, at 223; Werden, supra note 225, at 422–25)); Covad
Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (considering a preda-
tory practice to be “one in which a firm sacrifices short-term profits in order to drive out of
the market or otherwise discipline a competitor” (citing Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–23 (1993))); Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc.
v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 148 (4th Cir. 1990) (explaining that conduct is
exclusionary if a monopolist made “a short-term sacrifice in order to further its exclusive,
anticompetitive objectives” (citing SmithKLINE Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056,
1065 (3d Cir. 1978))); Ne. Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76, 94–95 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding a
properly instructed jury could reasonably find that a monopolist designed the product to
impede competition); Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307,
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Commentators have advocated the test.241  So have the leading antitrust
treatises.242  And the Department of Justice (DOJ) has advanced it in several
important cases.  For example, in Trinko, the agency asserted that “conduct is
not exclusionary or predatory unless it would make no economic sense for
the defendant but for its tendency to eliminate or lessen competition.”243  In
United States v. Microsoft Corp.,244 the DOJ contended that Microsoft’s protec-
tion of its operating system monopoly was exclusionary because it “would not
make economic sense unless it eliminated or softened competition.”245  In
American Airlines,246 the agency asserted that the defendant excluded rivals by
1330 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding technological tying cases “limited to those instances where
the technological factor tying the hardware to the software has been designed for the pur-
pose of tying the products, rather than to achieve some technologically beneficial result”);
ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (no liability
where “there was no evidence that IBM was sacrificing present profits with the expectation
of recouping its losses with subsequent price increases”); Abuse of a Dominant Position by
Reckitt Benckiser Healthcare (UK) Ltd. & Reckitt Benckiser Grp., PLC, Case CE/8931/08,
¶¶ 6.34, 6.42 (Office of Fair Trading Apr. 12, 2011) (Eng.), https://
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/555de4bbe5274a7084000156/rb-decision.pdf
(concluding that the product hop at issue would “result in a decrease in RB’s profitability
that would render the strategy commercially irrational in the absence of benefits derived
from hindering the development of full generic competition”).
241 See, e.g., Susan A. Creighton & Jonathan M. Jacobson, Twenty-Five Years of Access Deni-
als, 27 ANTITRUST 50, 54 (2012) (noting that, as applied to rival’s access demands, rule
“runs the least risk of reducing investment incentives while maintaining society’s critical
interest in preserving consumer welfare through competition”); Melamed, supra note 229,
at 389 (offering test providing that “conduct is anticompetitive if, but only if, it makes no
business sense or is unprofitable for the defendant but for the exclusion of rivals and
resulting supracompetitive recoupment”); Werden, supra note 225, at 422–25 (articulating
the “no economic sense” framework); cf. Henry N. Butler, REMS-Restricted Drug Distribution
Programs and the Antitrust Economics of Refusals to Deal with Potential Generic Competitors, 67
FLA. L. REV. 977, 1023 (2015) (“[U]nder the profit-sacrifice test, conduct is anticompetitive
only if the defendant has no legitimate business purpose for the conduct or it is unprofita-
ble in the short run and makes business sense only if a rival is excluded, leaving the defen-
dant with a supracompetitive recoupment in the long run.”).  For additional sources, see
generally Shadowen et al., supra note 1, at 75–77.
242 See generally IIIA PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 773e,
at 209–13 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining that refusal to deal is unlawful if irrational in the sense
that the defendant sacrificed an opportunity to make a profitable sale only because of the
adverse impact the refusal would have on rival); see also generally HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra
note 125, § 12.3, at 13 (“If a design change makes no economic sense unless the exclusion
of rivals is taken into account, it is reasonable to infer both that the purpose behind the
design change was anticompetitive and, more importantly, that the anticompetitive effects
of the design change predominated over any technological benefits.”).
243 Brief for the United States and the FTC as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
15, Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)
(No. 02-682) (emphasis omitted).
244 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
245 Brief for Appellees United States and the State Plaintiffs at 48, United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-5212, 00-5213).
246 United States v. AMR Corp. (American Airlines), 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).
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adding “money-losing capacity” and that “distinguishing legitimate competi-
tion from unlawful predation requires a common-sense business inquiry”
based on “whether the conduct would be profitable, apart from any exclu-
sionary effects.”247  And in United States v. Dentsply International, Inc.,248 the
DOJ argued that “Dentsply’s exclusionary policies made no economic sense
but for their tendency to harm rivals, and so were predatory.”249
* * *
Courts and commentators have offered the no-economic-sense test as a
basis for antitrust liability in settings like predatory pricing and refusals to
license, where the vast majority of conduct is likely to not present antitrust
concern.  In such a setting, satisfying the test has been treated as a necessary
element of liability.  Given the benefits of low prices and difficulties inherent
in punishing refusals to license, courts have been hesitant before finding
monopolization.
Similar considerations support applying the no-economic-sense test to
product hops in prescription drug markets.  Most innovation in most markets
is beneficial to consumers.  A lenient (to the monopolist) standard250 is thus
appropriate so as not to deter genuinely beneficial product redesigns.  The
no-economic-sense test also provides guidance to product developers, who
can know with a high degree of precision whether the redesign will clear
antitrust hurdles.
Given the unique aspects of the pharmaceutical industry, most notably
the price disconnect, it is conceivable that application of the no-economic-
sense test would not capture every switch that ultimately is anticompetitive.
For example, and as discussed above,251 a brand could avoid liability by engi-
neering a switch that would allow it to enjoy modest profits but result in sig-
nificant losses to consumers.  Our conservative approach would allow the
reformulation.
Stated differently, our no-economic-sense test (together with a rigorous
two-factor threshold for product hops and two safe harbors) would lead to far
more false negatives than false positives.  In fact, the construction of the test
ensures that there should be few if any false positives since the only firms
subject to antitrust liability would be those that engage in behavior that liter-
ally does not make sense absent its impairment of generic competition.  The
test would allow false negatives to the extent firms engage in conduct that
does not involve a lack of economic sense, but offers few innovations for
consumers while preventing significant price reductions.  We believe such a
247 Brief for Appellant at 2, 30, American Airlines, 335 F.3d 1109 (No. 01-3202) (public
redacted version).
248 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005).
249 Brief for the United States at 28, Dentsply, 339 F.3d 181 (No. 03-4097) (public
redacted version).
250 See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
251 See supra subection IV.B.1.
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tradeoff is justified based on the importance of innovation and business
certainty.
C. No-Economic-Sense Versus Hard Switch/Soft Switch
Courts’ and commentators’ product-hopping analyses have veered far
from justifiable economic analysis.  The no-economic-sense test would lead to
dramatically different analyses and results.  Courts and commentators have
drawn rigid distinctions between hard switches, viewed as anticompetitive
because the brand removes the original drug from the market, and soft
switches, viewed as not concerning because the original remains on the mar-
ket.  The lesson of this Section is that the no-economic-sense test is far supe-
rior to the hard switch/soft switch dichotomy for at least two reasons: (1) the
fundamental conduct that impairs generic competition is the reformulation
of the brand product and “cannibalization” of its sales by any means before
the generic enters the market, and (2) the “choice” theory that underlies the
dichotomy between hard and soft switches is not satisfactory.
First, it is not always, or even often, necessary for the brand to remove
the original product from the market to substantially impair generic competi-
tion.  What matters is whether the brand has successfully moved the prescrip-
tion base from the original to the reformulated product before the generic
enters the market.  The essential exclusionary conduct is the reformulation
of the product and cannibalization of the prescription sales base.  The partic-
ular means used to cannibalize the sales is not critical to the anticompetitive
effect.  Some means may be more effective than others in moving the sales
base, but it is the moving of the sales base, not the particular means, that
causes the anticompetitive effect.
This can clearly be seen with an example.  The brand in TriCor reformu-
lated the product, cannibalized it, interfered with the generics’ insurance
coverage, drained the supply chain of the original product, and entirely
removed it from the market.252  The result was that the generics made only
2% of unit sales.253  In Walgreens, the brand reformulated the product, canni-
balized it, and interfered with the generics’ insurance coverage, but did not
remove the product from the market.254  The result was that the generics
made roughly 25% of unit sales.255
According to the well-established economics of the industry, absent the
reformulations, the generics in both cases would have captured at least 85%
252 Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. (TriCor), 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 416–18 (D.
Del. 2006).
253 Transcript of Record at 534–35, Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Abbott Labs. (TriCor II),
580 F. Supp. 2d 345 (D. Del. 2008) (No. 02-1512) (on file with authors).
254 First Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 32–33, 36, Walgreen Co. v.
AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 1:06 CV 02084) [herein-
after Walgreens Complaint].
255 Id. ¶¶ 104–06.  Several years after entry, the generics had captured just 7.4 million
of Prilosec’s 29.6 million pre-reformulation unit sales. Id. ¶ 106.
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of unit sales.256  With a product withdrawal in Tricor, they gained only 2%.
But even without a product withdrawal in Walgreens, they gained only 25%.
In this example, the product withdrawal was more effective in impairing
generic competition, but the cannibalization without product withdrawal also
inflicted massive losses on consumers—60% of additional unit sales should
have been generic rather than branded, which would have saved consumers
roughly $1.9 billion annually.257  No difference in anticompetitive effect—in the
nature or essential magnitude of losses—can differentiate “hard” from “soft”
switches.
Second, despite broad statements to the contrary,258 no differences in
the nature of the conduct—in preserving or denying consumer “choice”—dis-
tinguish hard from soft switches.  The court in Namenda, for example, sug-
gested in dicta that consumers would have had the relevant “choice” if the
brand had left the original product on the market.259  The court asserted
that withdrawal of the brand product “forced” doctors to write prescriptions
for the reformulated rather than the original product.260  But at the time
doctors were forced to switch to the reformulated product, no generic was
available, so the forced switch obviously did not prevent consumers from
choosing a generic at that time.  Their prescriptions were simply moved from
one brand for which there was no generic to another brand for which there
was no generic.  Nor were consumers deprived of “choice” (in the sense in
which the Namenda court apparently meant it) when the generics entered.
Doctors at that time were perfectly free to write prescriptions for the original
product and have them filled with the generic.261
The Namenda court’s intuition was right.  It correctly perceived that
removing the brand product “forced” doctors to write prescriptions for the
reformulated brand and that doctors would not move prescriptions back to
the original product after the generics entered.  But the court’s dictum erred
in failing to realize that doctors will not move prescriptions back to the origi-
nal product regardless of the means the brand used to switch them to the
256 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUM-
ERS BILLIONS 8 (2010) (generics take 90% of unit sales at an average 85% discount from
the brand price).
257 Walgreens Complaint, supra note 254, ¶ 64.  An average 80% discount on 60% of
the $4 billion in pre-reformulation annual sales of branded Prilosec, see id. ¶ 42, equals
annual lost savings to consumers of $1.9 billion.  The evidence in Namenda showed that the
brand projected that if it did not withdraw the original product, it could have switched only
30% of patients to the reformulated product, but by withdrawing the original product, it
could switch between 80% and 100%.  New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC
(Namenda), 787 F.3d 638, 654 (2d Cir. 2015).  This evidence may have led the Namenda
court to give near-dispositive significance to whether the brand withdrew the product. See
id. at 655.  As we demonstrate in detail below, the court reached the correct conclusion but
used an incorrect analysis. See infra Section V.A.
258 See, e.g., Namenda, 787 F.3d at 654–55; HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 125, § 15.3.
259 Namenda, 787 F.3d at 655.
260 Id. at 654.
261 Id. at 654–55.
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reformulated product.  It is the timing of the reformulation in relation to
generic entry—does the reformulated product beat the generic onto the
market or not?—that determines whether consumers are able to make the
relevant price/quality choice.
The Namenda court’s dichotomy based on whether the brand removed
the original product has a rhetorical appeal but reflects an insupportably nar-
row view of consumer “choice.”  What deprives consumers of the ability to
make a price/quality trade-off is the combination of a price-disconnected
market and the brand’s reformulation and cannibalization of the original
product’s sales by any means.  It is the absence of prescriptions for which the
generics can automatically be substituted that deprives consumers of the rele-
vant choice.  Of crucial significance, the brand eliminated those prescrip-
tions through its reformulation and cannibalization.  The withdrawal of the
original product is relevant only indirectly—solely to the extent it causes a
reduced prescription base that limits substitution when the generics enter.  It
is the reduced prescription base that directly impairs generic substitution,
and that reduced base can be caused by conduct other than withdrawal of
the product.
Manufacturers engage in a variety of tactics to cannibalize the product
before generic entry.  In TriCor, Abbott bought back existing supplies of its
capsules from pharmacies and changed the code for the capsules in the
national drug database to “obsolete,” each of which encouraged doctors to
switch prescriptions to the reformulated product.262  In Doryx, Warner Chil-
cott stopped selling capsules to wholesalers; removed capsules from its web-
site; informed wholesalers, retailers, and doctors that “Doryx capsules have
been replaced by Doryx tablets”; and destroyed and bought back some of the
remaining capsules.263  In Suboxone, Reckitt raised the price of its original
tablets in relation to the reformulated film version, disparaged tablets, and
warned of purported safety concerns.264  The point is not that these tactics
involved a lack of economic sense singly and in isolation.  Some of them,
such as buying back stock and creating artificial price differentials, might well
lack economic sense even when viewed in isolation.
But these are mere tactics.  The exclusionary conduct on which the com-
petition analysis focuses is the reformulation and cannibalization of the prod-
uct; in other words, switching the prescription base.  The no-economic-sense
test applies to that conduct.  Withdrawing (or not) the product, creating an
artificial price gap between the branded products, buying back stock, chang-
ing drug codes, etc., are merely tactics, i.e., particular means by which the
brand engages in the suspect conduct of switching the prescription base.
262 Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA (TriCor), 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 416 (D. Del. 2006).
263 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott PLC (Doryx), No. 12–3824, 2015 WL
1736957, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015).
264 End Payor Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 42–44, In
re Suboxone Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (No. 2:13-md-02445).
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D. Applications
Part V below applies our framework to the five product-hopping cases
litigated to date.  But to provide more guidance to courts, the antitrust agen-
cies, and companies themselves, it is worth highlighting three general points.
First, a brand’s introduction of a new product, standing alone, will not
violate our test.  Indeed, it would not even constitute a product hop.  To state
the obvious, brands are allowed to introduce new products.  In the presence
of the price disconnect, antitrust concerns arise when the brand:
(1) reformulates the product in a way that prevents generic substitution
and
(2) cannibalizes its own sales by switching the prescription base from the
original to the reformulated product.265
These are the elements that, combined, require scrutiny under the no-
economic-sense test.266  As mentioned above,267 our focus on the switching
of the prescription base distinguishes between the expansion of the base by
taking away sales from other branded products or enticing new patients into
the market, and the switching of the base solely to impair generic competi-
tion.  The concern with the latter conduct is particularly apparent in the
pharmaceutical industry, which is plagued by the price disconnect, and
where the conduct may even make the original drug less desirable.
Second, whether the reformulated product is patented is irrelevant to
the no-economic-sense test.  An example makes this clear.  Assume that the
brand manufacturer projects that (1) without a product hop, the original
product will have annual sales (before the onset of generic competition) of
$500 million; (2) R&D and other costs of switching to the reformulated prod-
uct will be $80 million; (3) without a product hop, generics will quickly take
90% of the unit sales, leaving the brand with annual sales of only $50 million;
and (4) with a product hop, annual sales of the reformulated product are
likely to be $400 million (and sales of the original product will be $0).
Given this set of facts, application of the no-economic-sense test is
straightforward.  The brand manufacturer could be tempted to make the
product hop.  Without the hop, the brand would make $50 million in annual
sales.  With the hop, it would make $400 million in sales, at a cost of only $80
265 As mentioned earlier, see supra note 3, the switching of the prescription base raises
anticompetitive concern in threatening the generic-promoting goals of the Hatch-Waxman
Act and state drug product substitution laws, through a switch to a reformulation for which
a generic cannot be substituted.  And that conduct lacks any innovation-based justifications
because the brand does not build up the prescription base by competing with other brands
or expanding the market, but merely leverages already-gained power solely by blocking
generic entry.
266 Companies outside the pharmaceutical industry introduce new-generation products
even when there is economic life remaining in the old, and the mere introduction of new
products in the drug industry does not cause concern.  But competition concerns arise
when, in the presence of the price disconnect, the brand combines product reformulation
with switching the prescription base.
267 See supra text preceding Section IV.A.
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million.  But the hop fails the no-economic-sense test because, absent the
effect of impairing generic competition, it would not make economic sense.
The brand would be spending $80 million to move from a product with $500
million in annual sales to a product with $400 million in annual sales.  The
only reason the brand gains anything is that it impairs generic competition.
This analysis holds true regardless of whether the reformulated product
is patented.  For example, the reformulated product might not be patented.
Product hops can fail the no-economic-sense test when the reformulated
product is unpatented.  A product hop to an unpatented product can buy the
brand two years or more of life without generics, as the generics reformulate
their products and are required to start the lengthy FDA-approval process all
over again.  In granting approval of the brand’s reformulated product, the
FDA does not determine whether the reformulated product is an improve-
ment, let alone one that is worth the cost of lost generic savings.268  We
therefore apply an objective, economic test to pinpoint product hops where
it is crystal clear that the “improvement” not only is not worth the cost to
consumers, but also is not even worth the cost to the manufacturer.
On the other hand, the reformulated product in the example could be
protected by a patent.  Our framework would apply the no-economic-sense
test in a similar manner.  For starters, the mere act of obtaining a patent is
not even subject to the test since it does not involve encouraging doctors to
write prescriptions for the reformulated, instead of original, drug.  And
regarding the broader course of conduct involving a patented reformulation,
as demonstrated in detail in Section II.B, patent law does not require that the
product be an improvement and in fact allows patents on “less effective”
products.269  That is why the PTO routinely grants patents on minor differ-
ences in existing chemical entities such as different crystalline forms of a
chemical or different formulations that do not necessarily improve the prod-
uct in any meaningful way.270  Our framework thus appropriately does not
depend on whether the PTO issued any applicable patents.  Again, we apply
an objective, economic test.  Patent law provides no reason to do
otherwise.271
268 The FDA requires only that the product is superior to a placebo, not to existing
products.  See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 67 (explaining that the FDA “has
neither the mandate nor the power to take competition concerns into account in approv-
ing particular pharmaceutical products”); Jeanne Whalen, Glaxo Strategy Threatened by FDA
Delays, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2008, at B3.
269 Custom Accessories v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., 807 F.2d 955, 960 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
see also Rich, supra note 65, at 393 (discussing “the unsound notion that to be patentable
an invention must be better than the prior art”).
270 See, e.g., Forest Labs. v. Ivax Pharm., 501 F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (upholding
patent on enantiomer); Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (patent
on particular salt); AstraZeneca AB v. Mutual Pharm., 384 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(upholding a formulation patent).
271 In addition to patent and FDA law not requiring that the new product is an
improvement, the price disconnect prevents the market from determining whether the
product is an improvement worth the cost of lost savings from generic competition.  Anti-
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Third, we emphasize again that our framework applies the no-economic-
sense test to the product hop itself—to reformulating and cannibalizing the
original product—not to any particular cannibalization tactics.  For instance,
assume that, in our example above, the brand’s documents show that, given
the decision to switch to a reformulated product, withdrawing the original
product from the market would increase the combined sales of the original
and reformulated products from $350 million to $400 million by eliminating
confusion in the marketplace.  Under our framework, this is not relevant
because we apply the test to the product hop, not to the cannibalization tac-
tic of withdrawing the original product.  This example illustrates why: with-
drawing the original product increases sales only compared to not
withdrawing it.  Withdrawal increases sales from $350 million to $400 million
given the decision to cannibalize.  But the no-economic-sense test applies to the
product hop itself—reformulation and cannibalization—which decreased sales
from $500 million to $400 million.
On the other hand, a product hop with a hard switch might well pass the
no-economic-sense test.  Change the fourth assumption in our example
above: the brand manufacturer projects that sales of the reformulated prod-
uct will be $600 million annually, rather than $400 million as the example
originally posited.  The product hop, even with a hard switch, passes the no-
economic-sense test because the projected increase of $100 million in annual
sales is greater than the $80 million in R&D costs.
The no-economic-sense test does not apply to individual cannibalization
tactics (even to the one that some courts have thought dispositive—with-
drawal of the original product from the market).  Instead, it applies to the
product hop itself—reformulating and cannibalizing the original product.
V. THE CASES: A SECOND LOOK
Applying the new product-hopping framework to the five cases would
lead to markedly different results.  Two of the cases would come out the
other way, and all would employ a new analysis.  For starters, neither safe
harbor would protect the brand in any of the five cases.  Each brand imple-
mented the reformulation within 18 months of the filing of the first ANDA,
and none waited to launch the reformulated product until after generic
entry.  Consequently, each of the five cases would be resolved by applying the
no-economic-sense test.
The big picture is that the plaintiffs alleged in each case that the brand
projected that, compared to the sales it was enjoying with the original prod-
uct, it would not make any additional sales by switching to the new formula-
tion.  That is, the “new and improved” version would not entice patients away
from other therapeutic choices and would not allow the brand to increase
the product’s price.  In fact, in each case, plaintiffs alleged that the switch to
the new product was costly to the brand, usually in the form of lost unit sales
trust law must play a role because no other element of the regulatory regime is available to
analyze the conduct.
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(as doctors reacted to the reformulation by switching to a different therapeu-
tic alternative), and additional R&D, marketing, and licensing costs.  The
brand made these investments not to improve products and make new sales,
but solely to impair generic competition.
It is not surprising that each reformulation fails the no-economic-sense
test, at least based on plaintiffs’ allegations, because plaintiffs presumably
bring the most egregious cases first.  A detailed review of each case illustrates
how the no-economic-sense test can be applied to product reformulations in
the pharmaceutical industry.
A. TriCor: No Economic Sense
In TriCor, Abbott’s conduct made no economic sense, except as a
generic-impairment strategy.  TriCor was a successful drug, with its original
capsule form garnering sales of $200 million in 2001.272  But after the FDA
approved the tablet formulation in September 2001, Abbott encouraged doc-
tors to write prescriptions only for the reformulated product by, in part, “pre-
vent[ing] pharmacies from filling TriCor prescriptions with a generic capsule
formulation.”273  Plaintiffs alleged that Abbott did not project that it would
make any additional sales or profits.274  Yet Abbott incurred substantial costs
to accomplish the switch,275 including costs for additional R&D and market-
ing, new royalty payments, buying back existing supplies of capsules from
pharmacies, and forgoing a new indication for the original product. Absent
the impairment of generic competition, the reformulation and cannibaliza-
tion made no sense since Abbott incurred all of these costs despite in-house
projections showing no new sales or profits.
Abbott’s tactics in the cannibalization included withdrawing the original
products, changing the drug product codes to “obsolete” in national
databases, and buying back supplies of the original product.276  Considered
separately, the first two of those tactics might or might not make economic
sense, while the third almost certainly does not.  As noted above, however, it
is the reformulation and cannibalization (by whatever means) that is subject
to the no-economic-sense test, not the particular cannibalization tactics.  And
such conduct doesn’t make sense here because Abbott did not project any
increased sales, but incurred substantial costs to make the hop.  Abbott’s
reformulation and cannibalization did not make sense absent the effect on
generic competition.
272 Amended Complaint ¶ 40, Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Abbott Labs. (TriCor II), 580 F.
Supp. 2d 345 (D. Del. 2008) (No. 1:05-cv-00340).
273 Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. (TriCor), 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 416 (D. Del.
2006).
274 Amended Complaint ¶ 63, supra note 272; Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 93–94, TriCor
II, 580 F. Supp. 2d 345 (No. 1:05-cv-00340).
275 Amended Complaint ¶¶ 61–65, supra note 272.
276 TriCor, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 416.
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B. Walgreens: No Economic Sense
The Walgreens court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, but the allega-
tions reveal conduct that does not make economic sense.  Prilosec produced
an astounding $4 billion in revenues in 1999.277  Despite this success, and the
fact that it was AstraZeneca’s most profitable drug,278 AstraZeneca stopped
its promotion and detailing of the drug after it introduced Nexium.279
Plaintiffs alleged that AstraZeneca marketers, lawyers, and scientists
charged with “finding a solution to the impending patent expiration of the
company’s best-selling drug”280 conceded that “of the dozens of potential
actions that they considered to replace the anticipated lost Prilosec sales,
launching and switching prescriptions to Nexium was the worst for consum-
ers.”281  The company’s then-chief executive officer purportedly admitted
that “[i]f we had left it to R&D, Nexium would not have been developed,” but
“[t]he project was driven by the marketing people.”282
These broad allegations were bolstered by detailed, direct averments of
lack of economic sense.  Plaintiffs alleged that AstraZeneca expected (accu-
rately, as it turned out) that switching the market from Prilosec to Nexium
would cause a loss of sales.283  During the shift from Prilosec to Nexium
between 2000 and 2002, AstraZeneca’s unit sales increased only 11%, far less
than the increase of more than 30% enjoyed by prescriptions for other drugs
in the therapeutic class.284
This is not surprising, because, according to plaintiffs, there was “no
pharmacodynamic reason why a dose of (S)-omeprazole would interact with”
the body any differently than an equal dose of omeprazole.285  Confirming
this lack of innovation, the plaintiffs alleged that “[t]he FDA Medical Officer
who reviewed the entire set of clinical studies . . . concluded that ‘superiority
of NEXIUM over omeprazole was not demonstrated,’”286 with the review find-
ing that “[t]here are no studies which demonstrate that [Nexium] is superior
to [Prilosec], clinically or even statistically.”287  Similarly, the administrator of
the Federal Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services told attendees at a
physicians convention: “You should be embarrassed if you prescribe Nex-
ium,” as “Nexium is Prilosec. . . . It is the same drug.  It is a mirror com-
277 Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 148 (D.D.C. 2008).
278 Consumers Sue AstraZeneca over Nexium Ad Campaign, CONSUMER AFF. (Oct. 19, 2004),
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/nexium_suit.html.
279 Walgreens, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 149; Walgreens Complaint, supra note 254, ¶ 62.
280 Walgreens Complaint, supra note 254, ¶ 45.
281 Id. ¶ 47.
282 Id. ¶ 67.
283 Id. ¶ 65–66.
284 Id. ¶ 65.
285 Id. ¶ 54.
286 Id. ¶ 85.
287 Id. (second and third alterations in original).
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pound,” and “Nexium is a game that is being played on the people who pay
for drugs.”288
To obtain reduced unit sales, AstraZeneca allegedly incurred “enormous
out-of-pocket expenses” of “billions of dollars” to cover
the costs of research and development to produce and obtain FDA approval
for Nexium, incremental detailing and marketing expenses, stocking
allowances paid to retailers to induce them to carry Nexium, and returned
goods allowances paid to wholesalers and other direct purchasers in connec-
tion with the return of unused shipments of Prilosec.289
This conduct made economic sense for AstraZeneca only because it
impaired generic competition.
Regarding the specific tactics used to cannibalize the product,
AstraZeneca allegedly “stopped making positive product claims about
Prilosec and, instead, began making negative (and false) claims,” in the pro-
cess “attempt[ing] to weaken the competitive position” of Prilosec in favor of
its reformulated Nexium.290  In general, AstraZeneca allegedly “used distor-
tion and misdirection in marketing, promoting, and detailing Nexium.”291
Assuming the facts to be true (which the court should have done on a
motion to dismiss), the case thus could easily have survived based on the
conduct’s lack of economic sense.  In this industry, the price disconnect pre-
vents consumers from making the relevant price/cost trade-off.  Monopolists
therefore have an increased incentive and ability to make welfare-reducing
switches from original to reformulated products.  The complaint in this case
alleged not only that the product hop reduced consumer welfare, but also
that its sole purpose was to impair generic competition.
C. Suboxone: No Economic Sense
The third case also could have been decided on grounds of an absence
of economic sense.  Plaintiffs alleged that Reckitt projected that the reformu-
288 Id. ¶ 94 (alteration in original).
289 Id. ¶ 66.
290 Id. ¶ 62.
291 Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D.D.C. 2008).  For
example, plaintiffs alleged that AstraZeneca falsely told doctors
that “Nexium is the first [proton pump inhibitor][or PPI] to demonstrate a sig-
nificant clinical advantage over other PPIs;” that Nexium has “significantly greater
healing and symptom resolution rates for . . . patients;” that Nexium has a
“clinical advantage” over Prilosec; that the alleged clinical advantage “is demon-
strated in longer term maintenance therapy, as well as in the initial healing
stage;” that “more Nexium patients are symptom free;” that Prilosec has a “higher
number of treatment failures;” that “Nexium has been shown to have a clinical
advantage over omeprazole;” that “Nexium has a greater clinical advantage for
more severe patients;” that Nexium is “a better PPI;” and that Nexium is
“expected to positively affect other associated outcomes such as patient satisfac-
tion, [quality of life] and productivity.”
Walgreens Complaint, supra note 254, ¶ 91 (first and fourth alterations in original).
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lated sublingual film would not generate any additional sales or profits as
compared to the original tablets.292  In fact, Reckitt predicted that it would
make “as much as 30% fewer” unit sales of the reformulated drug.293  The
sole benefit that Reckitt expected to gain from the switch from tablets to film
came exclusively from destroying generic substitutability.294
Absent the effect of impairing generic competition, the switch made no
economic sense because it was very costly to Reckitt.  The company raised the
price of its original tablets in relation to the reformulated film version295
even though the film was more expensive to manufacture and package.296
Plaintiffs alleged that Reckitt increased the price of tablets by 15% while leav-
ing the price of film unchanged, which resulted in the price of tablets rising
27% above the price of film.297
Further revealing an absence of economic sense, plaintiffs alleged that
Reckitt “incurred substantial . . . costs to develop and manufacture Suboxone
film and switch prescriptions from the tablets to the film” that took the forms
of
developing the film product and gaining FDA approval to market it . . .[;]
pay[ing] a substantial royalty to a third-party manufacturer that supplies the
film technology to Reckitt . . .[; and] pa[ying] tens or hundreds of millions
of dollars more for its sales force to get doctors to prescribe the film rather
than the tablets.298
As a result, Reckitt’s North American business “experience[d] substan-
tially reduced profit margins and net revenue in 2011 and 2012.”299
In fact, based on plaintiffs’ allegations, Reckitt conceded an absence of
economic sense in its 2010 “Annual Business Review,” which stated that Reck-
itt’s “rapid[ ] conver[sion of] Suboxone tablets to . . . sublingual film” would
lead to “a short-term dilutive impact on net revenue and operating profit”
but “much better protects the medium and long-term earnings stream from
the Suboxone franchise in the US.”300
Reckitt’s cannibalization tactics allegedly included disparaging the tab-
lets to physicians and “warn[ing] of false safety concerns.”301  In particular,
Reckitt claimed that the absence of unit dose packaging raised the risk of
pediatric exposure.302  Plaintiffs also alleged that Reckitt “directed its sales
force to tell doctors that the film was more difficult than the tablets for
292 End Payor Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint ¶ 40, In re
Suboxone Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (No. 2:13-md-02445) [here-
inafter Suboxone Complaint].
293 Id. ¶ 37.
294 Id. ¶ 39.
295 Id. ¶ 42.
296 Id. ¶ 38.
297 Id. ¶ 42.
298 Id. ¶ 38.
299 Id.
300 Id. ¶ 40.
301 In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 674 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
302 Id. at 683.
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patients or others to abuse by crushing and then ingesting in order to ‘get
high,’” even though “Suboxone film is far easier than the tablets for patients
or others to dissolve and inappropriately inject or otherwise ingest.”303
These purported safety concerns did not seem so concerning given that
Reckitt waited six months after publicly announcing its removal of tablets,
until the FDA approved generic entry, before actually removing them.304
Absent the effect on generic competition, Reckitt’s reformulation and
cannibalization does not make sense.
D. Doryx: No Economic Sense
The Doryx case provides another example of lack of economic sense.
Based on data from the first quarter of the year, Doryx capsules were profita-
ble, garnering $50 to $60 million in revenues in 2003 and 2004.305  Accord-
ing to plaintiffs, Warner Chilcott projected that the product switches would
not garner any additional sales or profits.306
Plaintiffs additionally alleged that Warner Chilcott incurred additional
costs
to change Doryx’s dosage form from capsules to tablets, to add a score to 75
and 100 mg Doryx tablets, to change Doryx’s labeling to include applesauce
dosing, to introduce a 150 mg Doryx tablet, and to launch promotional cam-
paigns to shift demand from Doryx capsules to tablets (and discontinue cap-
sules), and then from Doryx 75 and 100 mg tablets to the 150 mg tablet (and
discontinue unscored 75 and 100 mg tablets).307
Moreover, the reformulated version was “more costly and difficult for
the defendants to manufacture than the existing capsule formulation, and
even required a reformulation of the delayed-release enteric coating on the
pellets of doxycycline hyclate that comprise Doryx capsules so that they could
withstand the compression force required to manufacture a tablet.”308  Given
that Warner Chilcott did not expect any of these added costs to result in any
increased sales or profits, these costs made sense only as investments in
impairing competition.
Regarding the tactics of cannibalization, Warner Chilcott stopped selling
capsules to wholesalers and removed capsules from the website.309  It
303 Suboxone Complaint, supra note 292, ¶ 44.
304 See id. ¶ 45.
305 See Galen Holdings PLC Results for the First Quarter Ended 31 December 2003, PR NEW-
SWIRE (Feb. 10, 2004), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/galen-holdings-plc-re
sults-for-the-first-quarter-ended-31-december-2003-58942652.html (identifying $13.8 mil-
lion revenues in first quarter of 2003 and $15.7 million in the first quarter of 2004).
306 See Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Class Action Com-
plaint ¶ 80, Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott PLC, 2013 WL 5692880 (E.D. Pa. June
12, 2013) (No. 2:12-cv-03824).
307 Id.
308 Id. ¶ 57.
309 Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott PLC (Doryx), 2016 WL 5403626, at *3 (3d Cir.
Sept. 28, 2016).
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ensured that retailers would “auto-reference” the tablet whenever doctors fil-
led prescriptions.310  And it further reduced demand for the product by
informing wholesalers, retailers, and doctors that “Doryx Capsules have been
replaced by Doryx Tablets,”311 and destroying and buying back some of the
remaining capsules.312  Whether or not these specific tactics made economic
sense when viewed individually and in isolation, the reformulation and canni-
balization, through whatever tactics they were achieved, reveal a lack of eco-
nomic sense.
E. Namenda: No Economic Sense
The Namenda case provides the final example of a manufacturer’s con-
duct that made no economic sense (absent the effect of impairing competi-
tion).  Namenda was one of Forest’s best-selling drugs, generating roughly
$1.5 billion in annual sales in 2012 and 2013.313  Plaintiffs pointed in the
complaint to Forest’s documents, which revealed that its product-hopping
strategy would produce a significant reduction in profits resulting from
“patients who, in response to the lack of availability of Namenda IR, decide
not to switch to Namenda XR.”314  The documents treated this loss as a “dis-
ruption,” and projections estimated “as much as ‘20% franchise disruption’ if
[Forest] withdraws Namenda IR from the market prior to generic entry.”315
Providing a hornbook application of the no-economic-sense test, one Forest
presentation included sales projections that showed that under any potential
scenario, it would “lose tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars in the short
term if it withdraws Namenda IR from the market.”316
The Namenda court noted that “in deciding to take [the original prod-
uct] off the market, Defendants were willing to give up profits they would
have made selling IR—Forest’s best-selling drug,”317 revealing a “willingness
to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end” and demon-
strating anticompetitive behavior.318  But the court appears to have applied
such a test only to the discrete conduct of withdrawing the old product from
the market, rather than, as we urge, to the manufacturer’s overall conduct of
reformulating the product and cannibalizing its sales (by whatever means).
Forest’s cannibalization tactics included a cessation of active marketing
of IR when it brought the reformulated version to the market.319  In addi-




313 New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787 F.3d 638, 647 (2d Cir.
2015).
314 Complaint ¶ 101, Namenda, 787 F.3d 638 (No. 14-cv-7473).
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 Namenda, 787 F.3d at 659.
318 Id. (quoting In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litig., 754 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2014)).
319 Id. at 648.
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letters on its website urging healthcare providers and caregivers to “discuss
switching to Namenda XR” with their patients.320  Finally, Forest sought to
convert the largest customer base of Medicare patients to the reformulated
version “by sending a letter to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
requesting that the agency remove IR from the formulary list, so that Medi-
care health plans would not cover it.”321  Absent the effect on generic compe-
tition, Forrest’s product hop did not make economic sense.
* * *
In short, application of the no-economic-sense test would lead to a dif-
ferent outcome in two of the cases and a different analysis in all of them.
Such a framework conservatively recommends liability only when behavior
literally makes no sense other than through its stifling of generic competi-
tion.  At the same time, it focuses on the low-hanging fruit of straightforward
economic analysis rather than getting bogged down in the tempting, but far-
from-compelling, tangent of hard versus soft switches.  The no-economic-
sense test is widely recognized as favorable to defendants, but applying it
leads to more rigorous outcomes in two of five cases and different reasoning
in all five.  This dissonance shows just how far the caselaw has veered from
justifiable economic analysis.
CONCLUSION
Judicial and scholarly treatment of product hopping has varied.  It has
paid various levels of attention to the regulatory framework.  And it has over-
emphasized the distinction between hard and soft switches, and offered a
simplistic and unsustainable analysis of “coercion” and “choice.”
This Article introduces a more justifiable framework for the antitrust
analysis of product hopping that is based on the economics of the pharma-
ceutical industry.  Most generally, it offers three ways for a brand manufac-
turer to avoid antitrust liability.  First, it defines product hopping so that
scrutiny is limited to reformulations involving the switching of the prescrip-
tion base.  This articulation limits antitrust scrutiny to hops designed to
impair generic competition rather than reformulations designed to compete
with other brands or grow the market.
Second, it introduces two safe harbors that ensure that the vast majority
of reformulations are not subject to antitrust scrutiny, providing brand firms
with more certainty and predictability than they receive under existing
caselaw.  Third, it provides a no-economic-sense test—a simple framework
that avoids a complex, open-ended analysis and that minimizes false positives.
Imposing antitrust liability on behavior that does not make economic sense
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Under the no-economic-sense framework, merely introducing new prod-
ucts would pass the test—indeed, it would not even constitute a product hop.
But when the brand combines a reformulation that destroys generic sub-
stitutability with cannibalizing the original product’s sales, the framework
would not treat as dispositive the distinction between hard and soft switches.
Removing the original product from the market is just one of many cannibal-
ization tactics.  Our framework applies the no-economic-sense test not to spe-
cific cannibalization tactics, but to the product hop itself—reformulating the
product and cannibalizing its sales (by whatever means).  A soft switch might
fail the no-economic-sense test, and a hard switch might pass it.  As in every
application of the no-economic-sense test in other industries and circum-
stances, each case will depend on the brand’s ex ante projections of sales and
costs.
Product hopping presents some of the most nuanced issues in antitrust
and IP law.  The consequences for consumers and the industry are signifi-
cant, and courts’ analyses of these issues have varied.  This Article offers a
conservative framework rooted in the economics of the pharmaceutical
industry that courts, government enforcers, plaintiffs, and manufacturers can
use to distinguish between investments in innovation and investments in
impairing generic competition.
